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I. Introduction
During the past two decades, this country has witnessed an in-
creasing number of hostile takeovers.1 Bitterly fought contests for
corporate control have become a familiar spectacle as business enti-
ties have aggressively sought to extend their economic dominion by
making unsolicited tender offers for other commercial enterprises. As
these struggles have escalated in intensity, the combatants have de-
veloped ever more elaborate and sophisticated stratagems and tac-
tics. When confronted with unsolicited tender offers, directors of tar-
get corporations sometimes respond by adopting far-reaching
defensive measures that drastically alter the character or capital
structure of their corporations. In implementing these defensive tac-
tics, target corporations frequently incur onerous indebtedness or sell
off some of their most valuable and essential assets. As a result of
these defensive maneuvers, the continued financial viability of the
corporation may be put at considerable risk. Because of the poten-
tially deleterious effects of these tactics, the motivations of the direc-
tors who adopt such measures are open to question: Are the directors
motivated by a self-indulgent desire to remain in office at any cost
or, to the contrary, are their actions attributable to a genuine con-
cern that the takeover presents a threat to the welfare of the
shareholders?
This article will consider the role that courts should play when
1. For one court's comments on this phenomena, see Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc.,
744 F.2d 255, 269 (2d Cir. 1984). In 1986, the dollar volume of mergers and acquisitions
amounted to $173 billion. Anders & Zweig, Friendly Takeover Offers Prevail Amid Insider
Scandal, Wall St. J., Feb. 25, 1987, at 6, col. 1. During the first five months of 1987, 2,056
mergers and acquisitions were announced totalling $106.3 billion. Burrough, The Takeover
Business Is Alive and Well, Wall St. J., June 26, 1987, at 6, col. 1. The stock market crash of
October, 1987 created many bargain priced stocks and appears to have stimulated a new
round of takeover activity. Sontag, Takeovers Are on The Rise Again, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 1,
1988, at 1, col. 4.
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the defensive measures of a target corporation are subjected to legal
challenge. In order to determine if the courts are currently equipped
to deal effectively with such challenges, it is first necessary to ex-
amine the takeover phenomenon in some detail and to identify the
special problems posed by hostile acquisitions. This article will then
address the adequacy of the current rules employed by the courts in
dealing with these problems. The evolving principles governing the
liability of target directors then will be examined and critically as-
sessed. Lastly, recommendations will be made as to how the courts
might handle takeover disputes more effectively.
II. The Mechanics of Takeovers
Generally, a "takeover" occurs when one business entity ac-
quires effective control of another business entity (the target corpo-
ration) through the acquisition of some or all of the target's capital
stock or assets. If the target's board of directors resists, the takeover
is described as a "hostile" or "unfriendly" takeover. The usual
method of attempting a hostile takeover is for the acquisitive entity
to make a tender offer to the shareholders of the target corporation.'
However, before resorting to a tender offer, the party seeking control
normally will try to arrange an amicable acquisition through negoti-
ations with the target's board of directors.$ If overtures for a friendly
acquisition are rebuffed by the target directors, the rejected but per-
sistent suitor's only remaining course of action is to circumvent the
directors and approach the shareholders directly through the me-
dium of a public tender offer.4
A tender offer is a publicly made invitation to all of the share-
holders of a corporation to tender their respective shares for sale to
2. This general background discussion of tender offers is drawn from R. CLARK, CORPO-
RATE LAW §§ 13.1-13.3 (1986).
3. Acquisitions by friendly merger or sale of assets typically requires, under applicable
state law, the approval of the target's board of directors before the transaction can be submit-
ted to the shareholders for a vote of final validation. See H. HENN AND J. ALEXANDER, LAWS
OF CORPORATIONS § 340 (3d ed. 1983).
4. Prior to the 1960's, the usual course of action for persons seeking to wrest control of a
corporation from its incumbent management was to initiate a proxy contest for control of the
board of directors. This method of acquisition was cumbersome, time consuming, and subject
to the regulatory strictures of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Then, beginning in the
1960's, corporate takeovers were increasingly effected by the direct purchase of stock from the
individual shareholders of the target corporation by means of a tender offer. This method of
acquisition is less time-consuming than a proxy contest and, until recently, was largely unregu-
lated. In 1968, however, Congress enacted the Williams Act, which imposed a regulatory
scheme on tender offerors generally comparable to that imposed on proxy contestants. In any
case, the tender offer has remained the preferred method for effecting a hostile acquisition. See
Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1250 (1973).
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the offeror at a specified price.5 In order to induce the individual
shareholder to subscribe to the tender offer, the consideration offered
will usually exceed the current market price of the target corpora-
tion's stock by a substantial premium.6 Typically, the consummation
of the offer will be made subject to the condition that the sharehold-
ers tender to the bidder a specified minimum percentage of the tar-
get corporation's shares. Normally, this minimum percentage will be
the amount deemed sufficient to convey working control of the corpo-
ration to the successful bidder. The offer may or may not limit the
maximum number of shares that the bidder will purchase. If the of-
fer does specify that only a stipulated maximum number of shares
will be purchased and the offer becomes over-subscribed, then the
bidder will buy shares from each tendering shareholder on a pro rata
basis and return the excess shares.
III. The Motivation for Takeovers
As to why tender offers are made, explanations abound.' The
bidder may believe that a target corporation contains unrealized val-
ues because of the less than optimal performance of its current man-
agement. In such a case, the bidder's intent is to increase both profits
and share prices by installing new and it is hoped more adept man-
agement, thereby capturing the target's unrealized values. On the
other hand, the bidder may view the target corporation as being effi-
ciently run, but believe that a successful takeover would result in a
business combination resulting in synergistic commercial gains for
both parties. If, for example, the acquiring and the acquired corpora-
tions are engaged in complementary lines of business, their union
might produce a business entity having a combined level of economic
5. The specified price of a tender offer may be in the form of cash, a package of securi-
ties or a combination of cash and securities. See W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE, BUSINESS ORGANIZA-
TION AND FINANCE 162-63 (2d ed. 1986).
6. See Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986) (76 percent premium
over market value); see also Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir.
1986) (22.9 percent premium over market value); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisi-
tion, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986) (20 percent premium over market value); Northwest
Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. III. 1969) (36.8 percent premium
over market value); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984) (62.5 percent premium over
market value).
7. See Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of
the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1162-75 (1984).
Some experts have said that the current enthusiasm for takeovers has been encouraged by such
economic and political factors as a permissive federal anti-trust and regulatory climate, a
ready supply of financing and a stock market that has undervalued the assets and cash flows of
many companies. See Stewart & Hertzberg, Investment Bankers Feed a Merger Boom and
Pickup Fat Fees, Wall St. J., Apr. 2, 1986, at i, col. 6.
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prowess not possessed by the constituent corporations operating on a
separate basis.
A closely related, but certainly less laudable, motive for effect-
ing a takeover is the monopolistic desire to increase the market share
of the acquirer through the acquisition of a competing business. Still
another explanation for a takeover bid may be the offeror's ego-en-
hancing pursuit of raw power, irrespective of any economic benefits
that may be gained from the acquisition. For instance, the bidder
might be primarily attracted by the prestige and increased compen-
sation that are associated with control of a larger business enterprise.
Another explanation, likewise involving dubious motivation, is found
when a takeover is initiated for the purpose of eventually looting the
acquired corporation through a sale, at market price, of some of its
major undervalued assets. An additional explanation for making a
tender offer is that the offeror seeks to stimulate the interests of
other investors by putting the shares of the target corporation into
market play. If competitive bidding then develops, the original of-
feror will profit through the sale of its shareholdings at a bid-up
price level.
Obviously, the explanations for takeovers are multitudinous and
make definitive listing difficult. It is equally obvious that the actual
motives for any given takeover will frequently be mixed and unar-
ticulated. Because of the inherent difficulties encountered in identify-
ing subjective motivation with any degree of precision, any effort by
the courts to assess the legality of a takeover solely on the basis of
the tender offeror's motivation would be a problematical venture at
best.
IV. The Socioeconomic Utility of Takeovers
Any consideration of takeovers presents the question of whether
the socioeconomic interests of the nation are better served by encour-
aging or by discouraging takeovers. The classic justification for en-
couraging, or at least not discouraging, takeovers is that they are a
necessary mechanism for holding incumbent officers and directors
accountable for their management and supervision of the corpora-
tion's affairs.' According to this theory, if a corporation is not being
8. See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 253-54 (7th Cir. 1986); see
also Regulating Hostile Corporate Takeovers: Hearings on S. 227, S. 678, S. 1264, 5, 1323
and 5, 1324 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Development, 100th
Cong., Ist Sess., at 84-85 (1987) (statement of Beryl Sprinkel); Takeover Tactics and Public
Policy: Hearings on H.R. 2371, H.R. 3250, H.R. 5693, H.R. 5694, H.R. 5695 and H.R. 5696
Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications Consumer Protection and Finance of the House
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operated to the best of its potential, the stock market will discount
the value of its shares. As the corporation's shares decline in market
value, more able entrepreneurs recognize a financial incentive to ac-
quire that corporation. An entrepreneur may then acquire that cor-
poration in the expectation that the entrepreneur will provide the
managerial skills required to rehabilitate the earnings capability of
the corporation, eliminate the discount in the market value of its
shares, and thereby personally profit. Thus, hostile takeovers may
provide necessary market discipline for corporate management that
has failed in its stewardship. Moreover, the mere threat of a poten-
tial takeover may serve as a continuing incentive for management to
act with the greatest of diligence in the performance of its duties.
Takeovers not only protect shareholders from incompetent manage-
ment but also promote the general economic welfare of the nation
through the forceful creation of more productive business entities. By
replacing inept management with skilled management, takeovers
presumably foster optimum efficiency in the deployment of the na-
tion's economic resources.'
The argument also has been made that takeovers should be en-
couraged because they promote the formation of investment capital
and thereby foster economic growth.10 This view holds that takeovers
reward shareholders for having invested in corporations and thereby
provide them with an incentive to continue to do so. Since takeover
bids invariably include a premium over the market price of the tar-
get corporation's stock, takeovers serve as an institutional mecha-
nism by which shareholders may realize increased value on their in-
vestments. Holders of this view regard the current market price of
stock as a reflection of all available information about the value of
the corporation issuing the stock. Therefore, to the extent that a
tender offer exceeds the market price of the target's stock, an une-
quivocal new benefit is made available to the shareholders of the tar-
get corporation. If shareholders are not permitted to freely avail
themselves of this benefit, the proper functioning of the market is
considered to be seriously compromised at the most fundamental
level." More particularly, this theory holds that, because the integ-
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., at 647 (1984) (statement of Frank H.
Easterbrook and Gregg A. Jarrell) [hereinafter Hearings]; KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 5, at
164.
9. See Hearings, supra note 8, at 348 (proposal of Bevis Longstreth); Lichtenberg,
What Makes Plant Productivity Grow?, Wall St. J., Dec. 24, 1987, at 8, col. 3.
10. See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 253-54 (7th Cir.
1986).
11. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Re-
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rity and freedom of the market should be maintained, directors of
target corporations should not be permitted to authorize defensive
measures that would interfere with or impede the takeover process.
Furthermore, as fiduciaries responsible for the welfare of the share-
holders, the target's directors may be violating fundamental princi-
ples of corporate governance if they adopt measures that restrict the
freedom of shareholders to profit by accepting premium-priced
tender offers.
Opponents of the takeover phenomena contend that takeovers
are not in the nation's best interests and, therefore, should be dis-
couraged. One argument advanced by takeover opponents is that the
current wave of hostile takeovers has distorted management priori-
ties. Under this theory, corporations have responded to the threat of
a possible takeover by emphasizing short-term earnings at the ex-
pense of long-term growth in order to render themselves less likely
acquisition candidates.1" Long-term growth is slighted in order to
avoid the poor current earnings performance associated with heavy
expenditures for research and development. Poor current earnings, it
is believed, cause the price of a corporation's shares to decline,
thereby inviting the unwanted attention of predatory corporate raid-
ers. 13 Unfortunately, the price paid for a policy of producing imme-
diate earnings may be the deferral or abandonment of the long-term
capital expenditures that are essential to the continued viability and
competitive status of the corporation. The prospect of vigorous com-
petition from foreign companies, which are not subject to similar
policy constraints, changes the corporation's problem into a national
one. As evidenced by burgeoning trade deficits, the ability of the
United States to remain competitive in international markets is al-
ready a serious problem that should not be aggravated further by
takeover distorted management priorities."'
Employee demoralization resulting from hostile business acqui-
sponding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981); see also Gilson, A Structured
Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 819 (1981).
12. See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 253 (7th Cir. 1986); see
also Hearings, supra note 8, at 143; Smale, What About Shareowners' Responsibility?, Wall
St. J., Oct. 16, 1987, at 24, col. 3.
13. Commentators have noted that shares of corporations devoting a significant part of
their cash earnings to research, development and capital improvements frequently sell for less
than their liquidation value. The stock market tends to prefer corporations yielding immediate
rewards over those corporations providing long-term growth and commensurately larger future
rewards to shareholders. See Lipton, Takeover Abuses Mortgage the Future, Wall St. J.,
April 5, 1985, at 12, col. 4.
14. Hearings, supra note 8, at 371 (proposal of Bevis Longstreth).
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sitions also has been cited as a reason for questioning the value of
the takeover movement.1 5 Successful acquisitions often are followed
by employee dismissals in order to eliminate staff duplications. Con-
sequently, even rumors of an impending takeover may seriously un-
dermine an employee's sense of job security. Employee loyalty to the
corporation also may erode as the perception grows that current
management is no longer in control of the situation and will be una-
ble to safeguard the interests of the employees. Thus, some employ-
ees may leave the target and employee performance may decline
among those who stay.
Another suggested malefic feature of the takeover phenomena
arises from the manner in which hostile acquisitions are commonly
financed.16 Takeover financing frequently involves massive borrowing
by the bidder. Thus, takeovers channel society's limited capital re-
sources into non-productive ownership restructurings rather than into
new productive investments. Investors neglect the development of
new technologies and the modernization of antiquated plant facilities
and instead devote finite capital resources to the financing of corpo-
rate control battles. Moreover, highly leveraged acquisitions that
culminate in a merger may leave the surviving corporation so dan-
gerously overburdened with debt that it risks eventual financial fail-
ure. 17 In addition, the high cost of servicing such debt may force the
successful acquirer to sell off pieces of the acquired corporation in
order to obtain the necessary funds for debt retirement. The result-
ing dismemberment of a formerly integrated business entity may ad-
versely affect the acquired company's employees, suppliers and local
community.
Whether takeovers effectively perform the salutary functions
claimed by their proponents or whether takeovers have the baleful
consequences claimed by their opponents is a matter of continuing
15. See Prokesch, People Trauma in Mergers, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1985, at 25, col. 2.
16. See Hearings, supra note 8, at 371-72 (statement of Stephen Brobeck); see also
Williams, How "Junk Financings" Aid Corporate Raiders in Hostile Acquisitions, Wall St.
J., Dec. 6, 1984, at I, col. 6; Lipton, supra note 13; Address by SEC Chairman John S.R.
Shad to the New York Financial Writers on The Leveraging of America, [1984 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,634 (June 7, 1984) [hereinafter Address of Chairman
Shad].
17. Clark & Malabre, Takeover Trend Helps Push Corporate Debt Upward, Wall St.
J., Mar. 15, 1988, at 1, col. 6. Some corporate executives have also pointed out that investment
bankers may have become overzealous in fomenting ever-larger takeovers, regardless of their
merit, because of the huge fees to be earned. Schmitt, If an Investment Bank Says the Deal Is
Fair, It May or May Not Be, Wall St. J., Mar. 10, 1988, at i, col. 6. In the $25 billion
takeover of RJR Nabisco Inc. by Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co. in 1988, the fees to be paid
to investment bankers and attorneys are expected to amount to nearly $500 million. Sontag,
LBOs Put New Focus On the Bar, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 19, 1988, at 1, col. 4.
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and unresolved debate. After studying the available data, the Advi-
sory Committee on Tender Offers of the Securities and Exchange
Commission was unable to reach any definitive conclusions as to the
qualitative impact that takeovers have upon the economy and the
corporations involved. The Committee stated:
After considerable study, discussion and consideration of
commentators' views, the Committee finds there is insufficient
basis for concluding that takeovers are either per se beneficial or
detrimental to the economy or the securities markets in general,
or to the issuers or their shareholders, specifically. While in cer-
tain cases takeovers may have served as a discipline on ineffi-
cient management, in other cases there is little to suggest that
the quality of management of the target company was at issue.
Similarly, while the threat of takeover may cause certain man-
agement to emphasize short-term profits over long-term growth,
there is little evidence that this is generally true. 8
The sometimes ambivalent attitude of the courts towards challenged
anti-takeover measures may well be a reflection of the mixed nature
of the data concerning the ramifications of takeovers.1 9
V. Reasons for Resisting Takeovers
Aside from the troublesome socioeconomic arguments for and
against takeovers, disquieting legal issues also arise when directors of
target corporations mount defenses to attempted takeovers. A tender
offer is addressed directly to the shareholders of the target corpora-
tion. When the directors of a target corporation authorize corporate
18. Hearings, supra note 8, at 566. A report of a congressional subcommittee has
reached a similar conclusion:
It may be the most that can be said about the economic evidence on the
impact of hostile takeovers is that the jury is still out. Much more evidence must
be developed to support a governmental policy substantially curbing, or facilitat-
ing hostile takeovers . . . . At present, a great deal of the academic "debate"
over takeovers appears to be merely a defense of publicly asserted positions by
proponents on each side, rather than an effort to seek knowledge and under-
standing. Unfortunately, much of the discourse does not seem to have brought us
closer to any firm conclusions about this phenomenon.
Concept Release on Takeovers and Contests for Corporate Control, Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 23,486, 51 Fed. Reg. 28,096 (1986) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240).
19. See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, at 255-56 (7th Cir. 1986).
One jurist has observed that:
[p]hilosophically, there is a wide divergence of opinion as to the proper role
of management in the face of a legitimate takeover attempt. Some urge almost
complete passivity on the part of management, while others would allow active
resistance and consideration of not only stockholder interests but such things as
employee interests as well.
Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp. 798 F.2d 882, 888 (6th Cir. 1986) (Guy, J., dissenting).
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action to defeat a particular tender offer, they interpose themselves
between their shareholders and the third party offeror in order to
prevent the formation of contracts for the sale of the shareholders'
stock. Questions immediately arise as to whether the directors pos-
sess sufficient legal justification to interfere with such contract nego-
tiations between otherwise legally competent parties.2"
Boards of directors of target corporations have advanced various
justifications for their adoption of measures in opposition to unsolic-
ited tender offers. The most common reason given is that the tender
offer price is inadequate and, therefore, the shareholders would be
harmed financially if they were to accept the offer.2" Hostile take-
overs have been opposed on numerous other grounds, such as: (1) the
hostile bidder planned the eventual breakup and liquidation of the
target corporation; 2 (2) the hostile bidder had a business philosophy
of emphasizing short-term earnings performance that was incompati-
ble with the philosophy of the target corporation in emphasizing
long-term growth;2 3 (3) that a takeover would thwart previously
made plans for the target corporation's merger with another com-
pany;"' (4) the bid was cast in the form of a coercive "two-tier,
front-end loaded tender offer" that compromised the shareholders'
freedom of choice;2 5 (5) the hostile suitor had an unsavory reputa-
20. One court has noted that
[t]he right of a shareholder to sell his stock is a private transaction between
a willing seller and a willing purchaser and in no way implicates the business
judgment rule. Therefore, a board of director's assertion of a unilateral right,
under the business judgment rule, to act as surrogate for the shareholder's inde-
pendent right of alienation of his stock is troublesome.
Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1260 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
21. See, e.g., Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1018 (1983); see also Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir.
1980); GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Minstar
Acquiring Corp. v. AMF, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAn-
drew & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 985); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984).
22. See, e.g., Treco, Inc. V. Land of Lincoln Say. & Loan, 749 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1984);
GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Cheff v. Mathes, 41
Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964).
23. See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986).
24. See, e.g., Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980).
25. See, e.g., Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Ohio 1987); Min-
star Acquiring Corp. v. AMF, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Horowitz v. South-
west Forest Industries, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1130 (D. Nev. 1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petro-
leum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). A "two-tier, front-end loaded tender offer" is an
acquisition accomplished in two phases. In the first phase, the bidder uses a tender offer to
buy, at a premium price and generally for cash, enough shares to establish a controlling posi-
tion in the target corporation. Once control is established, the bidder enters the second phase
and merges the target corporation into the bidder through an exchange of cash or securities for
the remaining shares of the minority target shareholders. The back-end exchange is typically
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tion for "greenmail"; 6 (6) a takeover attempt would interfere with
the target corporation's implementation of an internal development
plan;27 (7) a takeover battle would disrupt the target corporation's
orderly assimilation of a previously acquired business;2 8 and (8) a
successful takeover would be followed by a material and undesirable
change in the operating policies of the target corporation. 9 Whether
the perceived threat posed by any given takeover attempt warrants
the type of resistance subsequently adopted by a target board is one
of the most difficult and troublesome questions raised in recent take-
over litigation.
VI. The Form of the Directors' Response to Takeovers
As the reasons offered for opposing takeovers have been varied,
so too have been the defensive responses adopted by target boards.
Directors of target corporations have become increasingly adept at
devising new and sophisticated defensive strategies to foil unsolicited
tender offers. Some of these strategies have been sustained by the
courts, while others have been invalidated.
Typically, defensive measures are designed to accomplish objec-
tives such as: (1) rendering the target corporation a financially less
attractive acquisition candidate; (2) increasing the unsolicited
suitor's cost of acquisition; (3) reducing the number of target shares
available for purchase by the hostile bidder; (4) providing a financial
incentive for the suitor's abandonment of a takeover attempt; (5)
promoting competitive bidding by others in order to obtain a higher
price; and (6) providing the target shareholders with a financially
more advantageous alternative to the hostile tender offer.3 0 The im-
valued at a substantially lower price than the front-end offer for control. Commentators have
suggested that two-tier offers are coercive because they stampede the target shareholders into
accepting the front-end offer, even though it is deemed inadequate, out of fear that they may
otherwise be relegated as minority shareholders to the second phase merger and be forced to
accept the lower valued back-end merger price. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d
1059, 1067 n.2 (Del. Ch. 1985), affd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). On the issue of the coer-
civeness of tender offers, see CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1651
(1987). For a discussion of the use of two-tier tender offers by target corporations in connec-
tion with defensive maneuvers, see Grundfest, Two-Tier Bids Are Now A Defensive Tech-
nique, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 9, 1987, at 26, col. 1.
26. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). The term
"greenmail" refers to the practice of the target corporation buying out a takeover bidder's
holdings in the target, at a premium not available to other target shareholders, in order to
prevent the takeover. Id. at 956 n.13.
27. See, e.g., Horowitz v. Southwest Forest Indus., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1130 (D. Nev.
1985).
28. See, e.g., Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531 (Del. 1986).
29. See, e.g., Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964).
30. In response to unsolicited takeover bids, target corporations have used a variety of
93 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW WINTER 1989
plementation of some of these defensive tactics may require the tar-
different defensive measures, including:
(1) The open market purchase of the target corporation's stock as a means
of reducing the outstanding shares available for purchase by the hostile bidder.
See, e.g., Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964) (sustained).
(2) The repurchase, at a premium price, of the target shareholdings held by
the raider. See Samuel M. Feinberg Testamentary Trust v. Carter, 652 F. Supp.
1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); see also Heckmann v. Ahmanson, 168 Cal. App. 3d 119,
214 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1985) (invalidated); Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531 (Del.
1986) (sustained); Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964)
(sustained).
(3) The repurchase of the target corporation's stock at a premium price
from selected shareholders who were contemplating the sale of the stock to dissi-
dent shareholders seeking to wrest control from incumbent management. See,
e.g., Schilling v. Belcher, 582 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1978) (invalidated).
(4) A self-tender offer by the target corporation for its own stock as a
means of providing the target shareholders with an alternative to the hostile
tender offer. See, e.g., Samjens Partners I v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 663 F.
Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (sustained); GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp.,
624 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (sustained); Revlon, Inc., v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (sustained); AC Acquisition
Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986) (invalidated).
(5) A selective self-tender offer by the target corporation for its own stock,
which excludes the hostile bidder. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (sustained). Although the Unocal court upheld
the selective self-tender offer, the Securities and Exchange Commission has re-
cently prohibited target corporations from making offers that exclude the hostile
tender offeror. See Revisions and Amendments to Regulation 13, 51 Fed. Reg.
25,882 (1985) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(f)(7)-(f)(l1) and 17
C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(g)); Amendments to Regulation 14, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,882-83
(1986) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 2401.14d-10(a)-(e)).
(6) A counter tender offer by the target for the shares of the hostile tender
offeror. See e.g., Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 594 F. Supp. 623 (D.
Md. 1982) (sustained).
(7) The imposition of waivable restrictive covenants upon debt securities of
the target corporation that limit the target's ability to incur additional debt, to
sell assets or to pay dividends as a means of rendering the target a less attractive
takeover candidate. See, e.g., GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp.
1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (sustained); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Hold-
ings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (sustained).
(8) The sale of the target's most valuable subsidiary as a means of render-
ing the target a less attractive takeover candidate. See, e.g., Whittaker Corp. v.
Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. II1. 1982) (sustained).
(9) The sale of all of the target corporation's assets. See, e.g., Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Abrams, 510 F. Supp. 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(invalidated).
(10) The granting of a lock-up option to a favored suitor to purchase a
valuable asset of the target corporation at favorable prices in the event the hos-
tile tender offeror acquires 40 percent of the target's shares. See, e.g., Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)
(invalidated).
(11) The granting of a lock-up option to a favored suitor to purchase the
target's most profitable divisions at highly favorable prices in the event the hos-
tile bidder acquired one-third of the target's shares. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC
v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986) (invalidated).
(12) The sale to third parties of debenture bonds with accompanying war-
rants that allow the holders to purchase shares of the target corporation at re-
duced rates in the event of a tender offer being made which is not approved by
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get corporation to make large expenditures. These expenditures are
the target's board of directors. See, e.g., Gearhart Indus. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741
F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984) (sustained).
(13) The issuance to the target shareholders of redeemable rights to ex-
change their shares for premium value debt securities in the event a raider ac-
quires 20 percent of the target corporation. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAn-
drews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (dictum stating that
issuance of redeemable rights was valid when initially authorized by the board of
directors).
(14) The issuance to the target shareholders of redeemable rights to
purchase the stock of the surviving corporation at discount prices in a merger
between the target corporation and the acquiring corporation following a suc-
cessful takeover. See, e.g., Horwitz v. Southwest Forest Indus., Inc., 604 F.
Supp. 1130 (D. Nev. 1985) (sustained); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500
A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (sustained).
(15) The issuance to the target shareholders of redeemable rights to
purchase at discount prices securities of the target corporation in the event a
hostile bidder acquires 15 percent of the target corporation. See, e.g., Dynamics
Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986) (invalidated).
(16) An offer to exchange a substantial block of newly issued target shares
for publicly held shares of a favored merger suitor in order to increase the poten-
tial acquisition costs of the hostile raider. See, e.g., Crouse-Hinds Co. v. In-
ternorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980) (sustained).
(17) The sale of a substantial block of the target's shares to a favored
merger suitor in order to dilute the target holdings of a hostile raider. See, e.g.,
Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1983) (sustained);
Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1018 (1983) (sustained).
(18) The sale of a target's stock to a friendly party who agrees to vote the
stock in accordance with recommendations of a majority of the target's incum-
bent board of directors. See, e.g., Gearhart Indus. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d
707 (5th Cir. 1985) (validity not considered).
(19) The issuance of target shares to an employee stock ownership plan of
the target as a means of diluting the target shareholdings held by the raider.
See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984) (inval-
idated); Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975) (dictum stating
that this defense was invalid); Danaher Corp. v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co.,
633 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (sustained); Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC In-
dus., 501 A.2d 401 (Del. 1985) (invalidated).
(20) The sale of a target's stock on favorable terms to members of the tar-
get's incumbent board of directors. See, e.g., Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157 (1st
Cir. 1977) (dictum sustaining this defense).
(21) The issuance of target stock to a friendly party as consideration for the
target corporation's long contemplated purchase of a business from that party.
See, e.g., Northwest Indus. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Ill.
1969) (sustained).
(22) The issuance of a new class of stock to the common shareholders of the
target conferring super-voting power upon all shareholders other than a hostile
suitor acquiring 20 percent of the target's common stock. See, e.g., ASARCO,
Inc., v. Court, 611 F. Supp. 468 (D.N.J. 1985) (invalidated).
(23) The issuance to the target's common shareholders of preferred stock
having super-voting power that would be significantly reduced if the stock were
ever sold. See, e.g., Unilever Acquisition Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 618 F.
Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (invalidated).
(24) The amendment of the bylaws of the target corporation to provide that
sitting directors shall be removed only for cause upon a three-fourths vote of the
shareholders and that future bylaw amendments shall be by a two-thirds vote of
the shareholders. See, e.g., Treco, Inc. v. Land of Lincoln Say. & Loan, 749
93 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW WINTER 1989
frequently financed by massive borrowings. As a result, although the
corporation may survive the takeover attempt, it may be saddled
with such onerous debt that its future capacity to conduct business is
seriously compromised."1 Whether the alleged peril presented by a
takeover can ever provide sufficient justification for this type of fi-
nancial self-mutilation is problematic. It is the thesis of this article
that the courts must develop a set of rules that foster greater judicial
acuity in determining whether the harm allegedly posed by a take-
over justifies the particular methods employed to deter it. More par-
ticularly, courts should develop greater sensitivity in safeguarding
the legitimate financial interests of the shareholders as well as those
of the corporation as a separate and continuing business entity.
The anti-takeover measures adopted by a target's management
are almost invariably challenged in the courts by the tender offeror.
Such challenges directly raise the question of the proper role of a
board of directors when shareholders receive an unsolicited tender
offer. It may be argued, of course, that the proper role of the target's
directors is one of strict neutrality. The shareholders, as legally com-
petent parties, thus would be assured complete autonomy in making
F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1984) (sustained).
(25) The defensive purchase by the target corporation of businesses raising
anti-trust problems for the hostile tender offeror. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall
Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981)
(sustained).
(26) The execution of a standstill agreement wherein a major shareholder
of the target agrees not to make any tender offers for a stipulated period of time.
See. e.g., Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assoc., 600 F. Supp. 678 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
(27) The authorization of a significant increase in the amounts payable
under the target's employee benefit programs in the event of a change in control
of the target corporation. See, e.g., Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF, Inc., 621
F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (invalidated).
(28) The partial financing of a favored leveraged buy-out by the manage-
ment of the target corporation. See, e.g., Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d
882 (6th Cir. 1986) (invalidated).
(29) The execution of a no-shop agreement with a favored suitor under
which the target corporation agrees not to entertain any competing bids from
third parties. See, e.g., Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir.
1986) (invalidated); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506
A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (invalidated).
(30) The execution of a merger agreement with a favored suitor. See, e.g.,
Samjens Partners I v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (sustained).
(31) Issuance of cash dividends in order to facilitate target corporation's
largest shareholder in the purchase of target stock from arbitrageurs so as to
prevent the acquisition of such stock by hostile bidder. See, e.g., Ivanhoe Part-
ners v. Newmont Mining Copr., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987) (sustained).
31. See Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1260 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); Burrough, The Takeover Business Is Alive and Well, Wall St. J., June 26, 1987, at 6,
col. 1.
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their decisions to accept or reject the tender offer. This view, how-
ever, raises certain practical problems for at least some of the
shareholders.
In the past, a tender offer was widely, and rather naively,
viewed as a latter-day form of town meeting. The shareholders col-
lectively would hold a democratic and salutary referendum on the
performance of incumbent management."2 Upon analysis, however,
this analogy quickly breaks down. Unlike a shareholders meeting
that is held to consider a proposed acquisition offer by merger or the
sale of the corporation's assets, a tender offer does not provide a
mechanism for the dissenting shareholder to vote against the tender
offer as inadequate or undesirable and still to participate in the bene-
fits resulting from the consummation of the offer if it is successful.
There is no way to vote against a tender offer except by refusing to
tender. Therefore, no one shareholder can safely take the risk of do-
ing so without assurance that the others will do likewise. If an indi-
vidual shareholder refuses to accept a tender offer that eventually
succeeds, the shareholder will find himself in the dubious position of
being in a minority position in a corporation under new and un-
wanted management. The new management may very well "squeeze
out" the non-tendering shareholder by engineering a merger with the
acquiring corporation for a price less than that of the unaccepted
tender offer.3"
Shareholders face this dilemma because of their inability to act
collectively in responding to a tender offer. Indeed, in most instances,
the shareholders are unable even to communicate with one another
regarding the advisability of adopting a common course of action in
response to the tender offer. What the shareholders need in this situ-
ation is a knowledgeable bargaining agent, and the only agent rea-
sonably available to them is the very board of directors that the
tender offer was designed to circumvent in the first place.
As the foregoing discussion suggests, many shareholders view an
attempted takeover with bewilderment. Upon the announcement of a
tender offer, the shareholders are immediately presented with three
options: (1) they may retain their shares with knowledge that if the
offer is successful, their corporation will be under new and possibly
unsympathetic management; (2) they may tender their shares in the
hope that no better offer will be forthcoming; or (3) they may dis-
32. The following discussion of tender offers is based upon Hearings, supra note 8, at
333 (statement of Louis Lowenstein).
33. See, e.g., the discussion of two-tier tender offers contained supra note 25.
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pose of their shares on the open market at a price that generally
rises following the announcement of a tender offer." ' Rational selec-
tion of the most beneficial option often requires a calm and dispas-
sionate analysis of numerous complex financial factors."6 At the
same time, the shareholders are likely to be bombarded by confusing
appeals and arguments both to accept or to reject the tender offer.3 6
A seasoned institutional investor may well be able to cope in this
situation. Other less experienced investors cannot. As one court has
noted, many shareholders are passive investors who know little about
the companies in which they invest and are unfamiliar with the sub-
tleties of market analysis." These beleaguered investors will want to
avail themselves of the relatively more sophisticated financial exper-
tise of their directors in evaluating a tender offer. More particularly,
they will look to their directors to take an active role in creating a
process that will maximize the value of their shares as the successive
stages of the takeover battle unfold.
VII. The Rights and Duties of Directors in Addressing Unsolicited
Tender Offers
Recognizing the difficulties encountered by shareholders in re-
sponding to tender offers, the courts have unequivocally taken the
position that directors are under an affirmative duty to evaluate
tender offers and to oppose those that are determined to be detri-
mental to the well-being of their corporation and its shareholders.3 8
This activist role for directors is said to arise from their fiduciary
duty to protect the corporation and its owners from perceived harm
irrespective of its source.39 In the performance of this duty, directors
may formulate an anti-takeover policy to respond to a specific take-
34. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 283 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981).
35. See Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assoc., 600 F. Supp. 678, 686 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
36. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 285 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 45
U.S. 1092 (1981).
37. See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 254 (7th Cir. 1986).
38. See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273 (2d Cir.
1986); see also Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 1984); Panter v.
Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 299 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981);
Treadway Companies, Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 381 (2d Cir. 1980); Heit v. Baird,
567 F.2d 1157, 1161 (1st Cir. 1977); Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 678, 686
(E.D. Pa. 1985); Horowitz v. Southwest Forest Indus., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1130, 1134 (D. Nev.
1985); Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712-13 (N.D. Ill.
1969); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985); MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1247 (Del. Ch. 1985), aff'd, 506 A.2d
173 (Del. 1986).
39. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985).
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over threat and, in addition, to meet any generalized prospective
danger of inimical takeover attempts.40 It has been noted that direc-
tors should oppose detrimental takeovers "even though that policy
may not please all its shareholders"' 1 or "even if that [policy] is at
the expense of the short term interests of individual shareholders.'
When addressing a pending takeover bid, the board of directors
has an obligation to determine whether the shareholders' acceptance
of the offer would be in their best interests as well as in the best
interests of their corporation.' s Accordingly, the merits of the pro-
posed change in control should not be prejudged, but should be eval-
uated in a cool, dispassionate and thorough fashion." The board also
should investigate conscientiously the ramifications of the offer with
respect to shareholder welfare.
Unfortunately, adherence to such standards is often difficult.
Frequently,'a board of directors is under tremendous time pressure
in responding to an unanticipated tender offer. Under current federal
law, the minimum period that a tender offer must remain open is
twenty days.45 Thus, directorial decisions - which often involve mil-
lions of dollars, affect the livelihoods of thousands of workers and
sometimes bring about dramatic changes for the surrounding com-
munities - must be made quickly. Although the burden upon them
is a heavy one, directors have not been permitted to justify initial
opposition to a tender offer as a temporary holding measure taken in
order to gain additional time in which to further evaluate the offer."
Instead, the directors are required to confront the tender offer imme-
diately and to make a prompt decision whether or not to oppose the
offer.
A board of directors could limit its opposition to a takeover bid
to the mere exercise of moral suasion. Under this scenario, the direc-
tors would limit their resistance to a refusal to negotiate an amicable
acquisition with the potential bidder and to a counselling of the
shareholders not to accept any tender offer that might be made to
them. Some shareholders, however, have argued that even such lim-
40. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1079 (Del. Ch.), affd, 500 A.2d
1346 (Del. 1985).
41. Id.
42. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 299 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1092 (1981).
43. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
44. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 257 (7th Cir. 1986); see Re-
port of ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, Guidelines for Directors: Planning for and Re-
sponding to Unsolicited Tender Offers, 41 Bus. LAw 209, 217-19 (1985).
45. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-19(a) (1986).
46. Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 267 (2d Cir. 1984).
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ited resistance would be a prima facie breach of the board of direc-
tors' fiduciary duties, if the acquisition offer was priced at a substan-
tial premium over the market value of the stock. The courts,
however, have rejected this view . 7 Judicial acceptance of such a
principle would effectively force directors to choose between uncriti-
cal acceptance of any acquisition proposal above market price and
the prospect of personal liability upon rejection of such a proposal."8
Presented with such an unpalatable choice, directors might not base
their decision solely upon the merits of the acquisition offer. Thus,
shareholders would be denied the disinterested and dispassionate in-
vestment advice that they expect to receive from their directors when
confronted with a tender offer.
There are other reasons for not viewing the directors' rejection
of a premium priced acquisition proposal as a prima facie breach of
fiduciary duty. That a tender offer price merely contains a substan-
tial premium over market value, standing alone, does not provide an
adequate basis upon which to assess the fairness of the offering
price."9 The market may have undervalued a particular corporation's
stock for a variety of reasons unrelated to the intrinsic long-term
value of the corporation as a going concern. For example, internal
market dynamics, the vagaries of investors' perceptions, speculative
prognostications by currently in vogue analysts, governmental poli-
cies, political developments, general purchasing trends and ru-
mors-all play a role in market pricing and may render the current
market value of a particular stock an unreliable yardstick for mea-
suring the actual worth of the business as a continuing commercial
entity. In addition, the market price of a publicly traded stock is
solely a measure of the value of a minority position in that stock;
whereas, a tender offer is made for a controlling position in that
stock.50 Thus, the adequacy of a premium paid for control cannot be
assessed solely in terms of its magnitude in relation to a market price
that merely reflects the value of a single share. Instead, a detailed
valuation study must be made of the entire corporate enterprise in-
cluding the value of controlling that enterprise. Only then can one
47. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 298-99 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981); see also Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1082 (Del.
Ch.), aff'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984).
48. The Supreme Court of Delaware has stated, "To put directors to such a Hobson's
choice would be the antithesis of the principles upon which a proper exercise of business judg-
ment is demanded of them. The ultimate loss would, of course, be upon the shareholders."
Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984).
49. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 876 (Del. 1985).
50. Id.
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address the question of the fairness of the tender offer premium.
Consequently, courts have not condemned out-of-hand directors' re-
sistance to a premium takeover bid when the resistance takes the
form of a rejection of that bid and a refusal to negotiate with the
bidder.
In contrast to the essentially passive opposition of rejecting a
bid and refusing to negotiate, board resistance to takeover offers fre-
quently has been more obstructionist, involving strategems adopted
to actively discourage a potential acquirer from either initially mak-
ing or later proceeding with a tender offer.51 Admittedly, such defen-
sive measures limit the availability of opportunities for shareholders
to receive and then profit from tender offers containing a premium
over market price. Courts, however, have found that shareholders do
not possess any absolute contractual right to receive takeover bids.
Rather, the shareholders' ability to gain premiums from takeover ac-
tivity is subject to the exercise of the good faith business judgment of
the board of directors in structuring appropriate defensive tactics.52
In accord with this line of reasoning, courts have rejected share-
holder claims to invalidate defensive measures on the grounds that
the measures had tortiously interfered with the prospective economic
advantages to be gained by the shareholders from accepting the
bid,53 or that the measures had wrongfully restricted the sharehold-
ers' power of alienation over their stock." The courts have fre-
quently pointed out that if the shareholders become displeased with
the takeover policies of their board, they always possess the potent
remedy of voting the board members out of office.55
VIII. The Rights of the Tender Offeror
Different questions are raised when defensive tactics are viewed
from the perspective of the hostile bidder. Potential acquirers have
51. See supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
52. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1070 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 500 A.2d
1346 (Del. 1985).
53. In Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 298-99 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that if a defensive
tactic adopted by the target board results in the withdrawal of a hostile tender offer, the target
shareholders may not claim that the board has tortiously intermeddled with their business
affairs unless adoption of the tactic was in and of itself wrong as a matter of corporate law. In
addition, the maintenance of such a tort action would also require proof that the directors
acted with the intentional purpose of injuring the shareholders' expectancies. Id.
54. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1079 (Del. Ch.), aj'd, 500 A.2d
1346 (Del. 1985).
55. See Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 678, 685 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
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contended that obstructionist strategems employed by target man-
agement should be regarded as a tortious interference with the pro-
spective economic advantages that the hostile bidder could have
gained had the takeover been successful."6 The courts have recog-
nized, however, that a hostile bidder may not predicate such a tort
action solely upon an admitted economic loss sustained by the unsuc-
cessful bidder; rather, it must be based as well upon the unlawful-
ness of the particular means of interference employed by the target
corporation." Defensive tactics have not been found to constitute a
per se wrong to the hostile tender offeror." That the hostile bidder is
also an existing shareholder of the target corporation does not
change this conclusion." Admittedly, the target board owes the hos-
tile bidder, who is also a shareholder, the duties of due care and
loyalty that are owed to all shareholders. If the shareholder's hostile
offer may reasonably be viewed as contrary to the best interests of
the majority shareholders, however, the target board is considered to
have a supervening duty to protect the corporate enterprise and its
majority shareholders from the threatened harm. In short, when re-
sponding to a reasonably perceived harm, the target board has no
duty to guarantee the economic expectancies of a shareholder-bidder
who is deliberately provoking the danger being addressed.6"
In contrast to this generally accepted analysis, the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, applying California law, has taken a some-
what different view of the duties owed by a target board to one of its
shareholders seeking to take control of the corporation. In Klaus v.
Hi-Shear Corp.,6 a potential acquirer purchased almost one-half of
the outstanding voting shares of Hi-Shear Corporation in an effort to
wrest control from incumbent management. Thereafter, the Hi-
Shear board authorized the issuance of additional Hi-Shear stock to
various parties. This new issuance considerably diluted the stock-
holdings of the shareholder seeking to obtain control.
56. See, e.g., A & K R.R. Materials, Inc., v. Green Bay & Western R.R. Co., 437 F.
Supp. 636 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
57. See, e.g., Chris Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 360 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
58. In GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), the
court stated that "(dieterring an unfair offer is entirely legitimate .... Self-appointed poten-
tial acquirers of control are not a protected species in corporate law. The hostile offeror is not
entitled to have Board of Directors smooth his path to control." Id. at 1020.
59. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985) (uphold-
ing a selective self tender offer excluding the hostile bidder).
60. As the Supreme Court of Delaware stated in the Unocal case, "There is no obliga-
tion of self-sacrifice by a corporation and its shareholders in the face of such a challenge." Id.
at 958.
61. 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975).
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The Ninth Circuit found that the Hi-Shear directors breached
their fiduciary duties in authorizing the new stock issuance. The
court, however, did not employ the traditional duty of care and duty
of loyalty analysis. Instead, it analyzed the case in terms of a duty of
equality of treatment the court deemed to be owed by the directors
to all of the shareholders, including the minority shareholder seeking
control.6 Ultimately, the court concluded that when board action
puts a minority shareholder at a disadvantage in a struggle for con-
trol, the directors have breached their duty of providing equality of
treatment for all shareholders, unless a compelling business purpose
for their discriminatory action is demonstrated.63 Requiring the dem-
onstration of a compelling business purpose places a heavy burden of
proof upon target directors seeking to justify their opposition to an
attempted takeover. Thus, the Ninth Circuit's restrictive approach to
the use of takeover defenses severely limits the flexibility of target
boards in employing measures to ward off unwanted acquisitions.
This rigid analytical approach, however, has not found favor in juris-
dictions other than California. "
The majority of jurisdictions recognize that there are outer lim-
its to the nature and form of a target board's opposition to takeovers.
A board may not arbitrarily reject or refuse to consider any and all
acquisition offers regardless of their merit.6 5 Similarly, a board may
not adopt ironhanded defensive measures that will effectively pre-
clude any hostile takeover bid ever being made for the corporation.66
To allow a board to render a corporation acquisition-proof would to-
tally eliminate any opportunity for the shareholders to receive and
accept premium takeover bids and thereby profit from their invest-
62. In adopting this mode of analysis, the Ninth Circuit relied upon the celebrated Cali-
fornia case of Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., I Cal. App. 3d 93, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969),
which actually involved a determination of the duties owed by controlling shareholders to mi-
nority shareholders.
63. Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225, 233-34 (9th Cir. 1975).
64. See. e.g., Heckman v. Ahmanson, 168 Cal. App. 3d 199, 214 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1985).
In Heckman, stockholders challenged action taken by the directors of Walt Disney Produc-
tions who sought to thwart an attempted takeover by repurchasing, at a price containing a
substantial premium over market value, the Disney stock held by dissident shareholders seek-
ing control. In considering whether a target corporation may properly pay such greenmail in
order to ward off a takeover, the court based part of its analysis upon the general fiduciary
principle that shareholders should receive equality of treatment from their directors. The court
concluded that, in the absence of a compelling business purpose, directors of a target corpora-
tion breach their fiduciary duties by adopting a defensive measure that provides, as does green-
mail, financial benefits to one group of shareholders to the exclusion of the remaining share-
holders. Id. at 127, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
65. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1354 (Del. 1985).
66. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 253-54 (7th Cir. 1986).
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ment in this manner.67 In addition, the possibility of a hostile tender
offer has the salutary effect of providing incentive for incumbent
management to put forth its optimal efforts in conducting the busi-
ness affairs of the corporation. As a result of these considerations,
target boards have not been allowed to pursue policies of indiscrimi-
nate, massive resistance to all takeovers. On the other hand, just be-
cause a board of directors has a history of rejecting acquisition pro-
posals, an inference cannot be drawn that future proposals will be
arbitrarily rejected regardless of merit. 8 Rather, the board's opposi-
tion to each takeover attempt will be scrutinized and judged
separately.
One court has recognized that a board's power to resist inimical
takeover attempts includes the right to utilize prospective defensive
mechanisms. 69 Thus, before any actual bid for control is made, a
board may validly adopt defensive measures to discourage, if not ef-
fectively deter, future formal tender offers.7 0 However, the propriety
of maintaining these defenses in an actual struggle for control is sub-
ject to judicial review in light of the actual threat, if any, posed by a
particular acquisition offer when made. If the acquisition offer is in
the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders, the board
must dismantle its takeover defenses. 71 Thus, a target board's arse-
nal of potential defensive weaponry is subject to judicial scrutiny
before it may be employed in an actual battle to thwart a specific
takeover bid.
IX. The Ascendancy of the Traditional Business Judgment Rule in
Takeover Litigation
When defensive measures adopted by a target board are chal-
lenged, the courts almost invariably and without discussion have
turned to the traditional business judgment rule as the touchstone
67. See id. at 254 ("If ... [target] management is allowed to insulate the company
from any change of control to which management does not agree, the shareholders may be
unable to realize the potential value of their investment.").
68. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 295-96 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981).
69. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
70. In Moran, the Supreme Court of Delaware stated:
Here we have a defensive mechanism adopted to ward off possible future
advances and not a mechanism adopted in reaction to a specific threat. This
distinguishing factor does not result in the Directors losing the protection of the
business judgment rule. To the contrary, pre-planning for the contingency of a
hostile takeover might reduce the risk that under the pressure of a takeover bid,
management will fail to exercise reasonable judgment.
Id. at 1350.
71. Id. at 1354, 1357.
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for their analyses. The traditional business judgment rule sets forth
the general standard used by courts to evaluate decisions made by
boards of directors. This rule has been part of the common law of
this country for over one hundred and fifty years.73 Apparently, all
jurisdictions have embraced the rule.7 '
The Supreme Court of Delaware has set forth a typical contem-
porary formulation of the business judgment rule as follows: "The
business judgment rule . . . is a presumption that in making a busi-
ness decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed ba-
sis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action was taken in
the best interests of the company. ' 75 Thus, the business judgment
rule accords a presumption of propriety to decisions made by the
directors of a corporation.76 Under this rule, courts will refrain from
reviewing the merits of a board's decision and will give great defer-
ence to matters decided by the board.77 To overcome the presump-
tion of propriety, the party challenging a directorial decision bears
the initial burden of proving facts such as lack of good faith, lack of
due care, or self-dealing, sufficient to remove the action of the board
72. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 295 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981); see also Treadway v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 381 (2d Cir. 1980);
Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 701 (2d Cir. 1980); Enterra Corp. v. SGS
Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 678, 686-87 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 555 F.
Supp. 892, 903 (W.D.N.Y.), affd, 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1010
(1983); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985); Pogostin v.
Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984).
73. See, e.g., Smith v. Prattville Mfg. Co., 29 Ala. 503 (1857); Hodges v. New England
Screw Co., I R.I. 312 (1850); Godbold v. Branch Bank, 11 Ala. 191 (1847); Percy v. Mil-
loudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 678 (La. 1829).
74. Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1974). In Miller,
the court stated, "The sound business judgment rule ... expresses the unanimous decision of
American courts to eschew intervention in corporation decision-making if the judgment of di-
rectors and officers . . .[is] uninfluenced by personal considerations and is exercised in good
faith." Id.
75. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). Another typical formulation that
is frequently quoted by the courts is that the business judgment rule "bars judicial inquiry into
actions of corporate directors taken in good faith and in the exercise of honest judgment in the
lawful and legitimate furtherance of corporate purposes." Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d
619, 629, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (1979).
76. See Horowitz v. Southwest Forest Indus., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1130, 1135 (D. Nev.
1985); see also Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assoc., 600 F. Supp. 678, 685 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986); Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,
954 (Del. 1985); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985).
77. See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273 (2d Cir.
1986); see also Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 702 (2d Cir. 1980); Min-
star Acquiring Corp. v. AMF, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Horowitz v.
Southwest Forest Indus., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1130, 1134 (D. Nev. 1985); Buffalo Forge Co. v.
Ogden Corp., 555 F. Supp. 892, 903 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1018 (1983).
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from the protective mantle of the rule.78 If the presumption is not
rebutted, the business judgment rule insulates the directors from per-
sonal liability for their decision and protects the decision itself from
attack.79 On the other hand, if the challenging party can prove that
the directors acted in bad faith, lacked due care, or acted out of self-
interest, the protection of the business judgment rule is withdrawn
and the burden shifts to the directors to prove the fairness of the
transaction to the satisfaction of a reviewing court."a
Given the organizational structure of a corporation, the adop-
tion of a rule of judicial non-interference in directorial decision-mak-
ing was inevitable. Furthermore, nearly all state corporation codes
provide that the business and affairs of a corporation shall be man-
aged by its board of directors.8" The business judgment rule is,
therefore, a judicial acknowledgment of the managerial prerogatives
conferred by statute upon directors. It is also a prudent rule of judi-
cial self-restraint that recognizes the institutional inadequacy of
courts to exercise judicial power effectively in matters involving busi-
ness judgment.82 Most courts lack the training and experience neces-
sary to review directly the manifold decisions made by directors.
Given the highly discretionary nature of most business decisions,
there is a lack of objective criteria against which to measure the
correctness of any given business decision. Moreover, allowing liti-
gants to question the decisions of directors frequently in the courts
would severely disrupt the orderly conduct of corporate affairs.
The breadth of protection afforded directors by the business
judgment rule is considerable. Courts have emphasized that they will
not interfere with the good faith management of the corporation in
order to correct directorial decisions marred by honest errors or mis-
78. See Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933, 950 (N.D. Ill. 1982); see also
Moran v. Household Int'l Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1074 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 812 (Del. 1984); AC Acquisition Corp. v. Anderson Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, Il1
(Del. Ch. 1986).
79. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 n.10 (Del.
1986).
80. See Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264-65 (2d Cir. 1984); see
also Crouse-Hinds v. Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 702 (2d Cir. 1980); Treadway Cos. v.
Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983); Enterra
Corp. v. SGS Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 678, 685-86 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,
457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983); AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d
103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986).
81. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 300 (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a)
(1983); MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.01 (1985).
82. See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1986);
Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.S.2d 619, 630, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (1979).
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takes in judgment.83 Absent proof that a board's decision was the
product of a faulty deliberative process or tainted by director self-
interest, the courts will not second-guess the directors.8 4 Under the
business judgment rule, it is contemplated that directors who are
guilty of mistaken judgment normally will be punished by their even-
tual ouster from office by irate shareholders, or through their even-
tual replacement by a successful hostile takeover, prompted by the
poor market performance of their ineptly managed corporation.85
The courts, however, will directly intervene in egregious cases and
impose civil liability upon inept directors.
Under the aegis of the business judgment rule, the directors of
target corporations are frequently afforded wide latitude in devising
strategies to resist unfriendly takeover advances.86 Thus, courts have
upheld a wide variety of drastic defensive measures designed to deter
or repel unsolicited tender offers.87 On the other hand, the courts
also have held that the business judgment rule does not provide a
license for a target board to take any and all action necessary to
defeat an attempted acquisition, merely because the board has rea-
sonably concluded that the takeover would not be in the best inter-
ests of the corporation.88 One court recently noted that the target
board "does not hold a blank check to use all possible strategies to
forestall the acquisition moves."8 9 Thus, at times, the practice of the
courts appears to conflict with the rhetoric of the courts. This appar-
ent contradiction will now be examined.
X. The Judicial Debilitation of the Business Judgment Rule in
Early Takeover Cases
In some of the early takeover cases, courts seemed to grant the
boards of directors of target corporations virtual carte blanche in
83. See Treco, Inc. v. Land of Lincoln Sav. & Loan, 638 F.2d 367, 377 (7th Cir. 1984);
see also Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 678, 685 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Moran v.
Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1074 (Del. Ch.), affd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985);
Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964):
84. Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 555 F. Supp. 892, 903 (W.D.N.Y. 1983), affd,
717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983); AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Ander-
son Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986).
85. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1986).
86. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273 (2d Cir.
1986); Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984); Horowitz v.
Southwest Forest Indus., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1130, 1135 (D. Nev. 1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 957 (Del. 1985).
87. Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 678, 686-87 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
88. Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 265-66 (2d Cir. 1984).
89. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisitions, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273 (2d Cir.
1986).
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structuring and deploying defensive measures to defeat unsolicited
tender offers. These early cases reveal an almost automatic and
mechanical judicial conferral of the protection of the business judg-
ment rule upon board decisions to employ particular defensive tac-
tics."0 Little, if any, consideration was given by the courts to the
effect that such defenses might have upon the financial welfare of
the corporation or its shareholders. The case of Panter v. Marshall
Field & Co." typifies this early, uncritical judicial approach.
In Panter, Carter Hawley Hale, an operator of retail depart-
ment stores, sought to enter merger negotiations with Marshall Field
& Co., the nation's eighth largest department store chain. At one
point, Carter Hawley announced its desire to make a tender offer for
Marshall Field shares at a price containing a premium of ninety-one
percent over the stock's then market value, but the Field board of
directors consistently refused to negotiate. Instead, the Field board
of directors authorized the expenditure of $41 million to acquire
stores in locations where Carter Hawley had already established a
competitive presence. These acquisitions exacerbated the possibility
of antitrust violations if the two retailing corporations were to merge.
In addition, the major cost of the acquisitions rendered Marshall
Field a financially less attractive takeover candidate because of the
resultant drain upon its cash reserves. Furthermore, two of the stores
were openly referred to as "dogs" by the Field board of directors.9"
Due to these considerations, Carter Hawley withdrew its proposed
tender offer. The market price of Field's stock, which had risen from
$22 per share to $34 per share during the takeover struggle,
promptly plummeted to $19 per share. Indignant Field shareholders
then instituted a class action against their directors claiming that the
directors had breached their fiduciary duties by making imprudent
defensive acquisitions as a means of perpetuating themselves in
office.
In upholding the trial court's directed verdict for the Marshall
Field directors, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals quickly found
that the merits of the board's acquisition decision were immune from
meaningful judicial examination, because of the protective shield of
the business judgment rule. The court recited the familiar litany that
90. See, e.g., Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
999 (1981); Treadway Cos., v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1018 (1983); Whittaker Corp. v. Care Corp., 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. II1. 1982); Heit v.
Baird, 567 F.2d 1157 (1st Cir. 1977).
91. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
92. Id. at 291.
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the plaintiffs were unable to affirmatively prove bad faith, overreach-
ing, or fraud on the part of the board and were, therefore, unable to
overcome the presumption of propriety accorded to the board's ac-
tions under the rule. Experience indicates that those seeking to sur-
mount the business judgment rule on these elusive and difficult-to-
prove grounds frequently face a herculean, if not impossible task.O
The Panter court then apparently concluded that the motivation
of the directors is the determinative issue in cases challenging defen-
sive stratagems adopted by target boards. The court stated:
Thus even if the desire to fend off . . . [Carter Hawley
Hale] was among the motives of the board in entering the trans-
action, because the plaintiffs have failed to establish that such a
motive was the sole or primary purpose, . . the mere allega-
tion, or even some proof, that a given transaction was made on
"unfavorable" terms does not meet the fairly stringent burden
the business judgment rule imposes on plaintiffs. 4
Under this "primary purpose" test, a defensive measure was not sub-
ject to judicial scrutiny on its merits unless it appeared that the di-
rectors, in adopting the measure, were solely or primarily motivated
by a self-indulgent desire to retain their status as corporate officers.
The directors would be required to justify the fairness and reasona-
bleness of their defensive tactics only if the plaintiff could show that
a motive of self-entrenchment predominated. 95
This "motive" or "primary purpose" approach to applying the
business judgment rule in takeover cases initially gained wide ac-
ceptance. 96 Courts soon encountered difficulties with this approach,
93. In a well-reasoned dissent, Judge Cudahy stated: "I emphatically disagree that the
business judgment rule should clothe directors, battling blindly to fend off a threat to their
control, with an almost irrebuttable presumption of sound business judgment, prevailing over
everything but the elusive hobgoblins of fraud, bad faith or abuse of discretion." Panter v.
Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 299 (7th Cir. 1981) (Cudahy, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
94. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 297 (7th Cir. 1981).
95. See Treadway Cos., v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1018 (1983); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 702 (2d Cir.
1980); Schilling v. Belcher, 582 F.2d 995, 1004-05 (5th Cir. 1978). Directors will not be pre-
sumed to have been primarily motivated by a desire to perpetuate themselves in office merely
because the defensive tactic adopted proved to be successful and resulted in the directors re-
taining their board membership. See Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 702
(2d Cir. 1980).
96. Treco, Inc. v. Land of Lincoln Say. & Loan, 749 F.2d 374, 378-79 (7th Cir. 1984);
Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981);
Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 381-82 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1018 (1983); Schilling v. Belcher, 582 F.2d 995, 1004-05 (5th Cir. 1978); Minstar Acquiring
Corp. v. AMF, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1260 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Horowitz v. Southwest Forest
Indus., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1130, 1135 (D. Nev. 1985); Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assocs., 600 F.
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however, because all directorial decisions are, arguably, motivated,
to a greater or lesser degree, by a desire of the directors to remain in
office.97 The institutional reward for the successful stewardship of a
corporation's affairs by incumbent directors is the reelection of those
directors by satisfied shareholders. No director wishes to be ignomin-
iously ousted from office by discontented shareholders and thereby
be branded as incompetent or ineffectual. In this sense, all directorial
actions can be viewed as being based upon an element of conscious
self-interest to continue in office. To seek to remain in office is no
more than to seek the corporate culture's imprimatur for the merito-
rious performance of managerial services.
Because of the inherently mixed motives underlying any board
decision, the courts have not withdrawn the defense of the business
judgment rule from a board that had self-perpetuation as one of its
several purposes for adopting a particular defensive strategy.98 Only
when the principal motivation is indulgent self-interest will the rule's
protection be withheld. The integrity of this "motive" mode of analy-
sis is highly dubious. Under this approach, a court is required to
assign relative weight to the various subjective purposes of the direc-
tors that ultimately produce a final board decision. Since any given
decision may be the product of a multitude of interreactive consider-
ations, both conscious and subconscious, any judicial attempt to de-
termine the sole or even primary motive is likely to be a quixotic
quest at best.99
Other cogent arguments have been advanced for not making
motive the central focus of a court's analysis in determining whether
a target board may invoke the business judgment rule. One such ar-
gument is evident upon consideration of a frequently used alternative
Supp. 678, 686 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933, 950-51 (N.D.
III. 1982); Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401, 408 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953-54 (Del. 1985); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627
(Del. 1984); Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 500, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (1964).
97. Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 1981).
98. See Treco, Inc. v. Land of Lincoln Say. & Loan, 749 F.2d 374, 378-79 (7th Cir.
1984); Johnson v. Trueblood, 646 F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999
(1981); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 297 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1092 (1981); Heit v. Baird, 467 F.2d 1157, 1161 (1st Cir. 1977); Horowitz v. Southwest For-
est Indus., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1130, 1135 (D. Nev. 1985); Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F.
Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 (N.D. II1. 1969); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490
A.2d 1059, 1076 (Del. Ch.), affid, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
99. See Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 300 n.6 (3d Cir. 1980) (Rosenn, J., dis-
senting), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 999 (1981). The best evidence of a board's subjective motiva-
tion is oral testimony from the members of the board. Such testimony, however, is inherently
suspect due to its self-serving nature. See Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690,
704 (2d Cir. 1980).
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formulation of the primary motive test. It is often stated that action
taken by the board, which has the collateral effect of enhancing the
power of incumbent management, is valid if the action has, as its
principal purpose, some legitimate corporate goal. 110 In many in-
stances, an anti-takeover measure can retrospectively be viewed
through creative reasoning as having a plausible, licit corporate pur-
pose, as opposed to the illicit purpose of director entrenchment in
office. By hiring prestigious investment banking firms and distin-
guished counsel to formulate post hoc rationales, directors can fre-
quently be expected to meet the low threshold requirements for in-
voking the protection of the business judgment rule.1"1
The case of Heit v. Baird'02 provides an insight as to how evi-
dence used to establish motive may be susceptible to artful manipu-
lation. In the Baird case, a board of directors faced with a takeover
threat authorized the issuance and sale of a large block of new stock
to three board members on very favorable financing -terms. Although
the case was decided on a procedural point, the court noted that the
sale of stock may have served any of a number of entirely proper
corporate purposes, such as: (1) assuring the target corporation of
some new capital; (2) promoting an increase in the loyalty and effort
of key personnel who benefitted from the favorable financing; or (3)
encouraging key personnel to remain with the company by increas-
ing their financial commitment to it.'03 As directors, aided by ex-
perts, become more adept at leaving the necessary paper trail as jus-
tification for their decisions, they will be able to clothe their anti-
takeover actions with the outward indicia of acceptable motivation.
Consequently, the integrity of the primary purpose test is severely
compromised by its susceptibility to abusive manipulation.
XI. Judicial Attempts to Rejuvenate the Traditional Business
Judgment Rule
In many recent takeover cases, the motivation of the directors
100. See, e.g.., Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1161 (lst Cir. 1977); Northwest Indus.,
Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 (N.D. Il1. 1969).
101. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 299 (7th Cir.) (Cudahy, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
102. Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157 (1st Cir. 1977).
103. Id. at 1161. On a number of occasions, courts have upheld corporate stock transac-
tions intended to affect control where the directors have been able to show that the transac-
tions were entered into for an overall proper corporate purpose. See, e.g., Treadway Cos. v.
Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983); Northwest
Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 (N.D. I1. 1969); Cheffv. Mathes, 41
Del. Ch. 494, 500, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (1964).
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has ceased being the focal point of the court's inquiry. Instead,
greater emphasis has been placed upon the role played by the busi-
ness judgment rule as the standard for evaluating the performance of
directors in carrying out their traditional fiduciary duties of due care
and loyalty.1"" Under this analysis, the business judgment rule
shields board decisions from judicial examination on the merits only
when the directors have complied with their fiduciary duties in mak-
ing their decisions. The rule, of course, initially assumes a presump-
tion of compliance. Once a party challenging a board decision, how-
ever, presents a prima facie case of a breach of either fiduciary duty,
the burden shifts to the directors to demonstrate that their action
was fair and served the best interests of the corporation and its
shareholders.
In most jurisdictions, the duty of care imposed on directors is
that degree of diligence that reasonably prudent persons in similar
positions would exercise under similar circumstances."0 5 One court
noted, in an oft-cited opinion, that the directors' "methodologies and
procedures" must not be "so restricted in scope, so shallow in execu-
tion, or otherwise so pro forma or halfhearted as to constitute a pre-
text or sham." 106 Rather, the board decision must be made on the
basis of "reasonable diligence in gathering and considering material
information" so that the decision may be characterized as an in-
formed one.10 7 More particularly, in the context of a takeover, the
board must examine carefully the merits of the proposed change in
control. 10 8
The duty of loyalty, the other major fiduciary obligation of the
directors, prohibits directors from entering into self-dealing transac-
tions.109 Directors must not allow their personal interests to prevail
over the interests of the corporation and the shareholders.110 More
particularly, in the context of a takeover, the actions taken by the
directors should respond to the needs of the shareholders and should
104. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273 (2d
Cir. 1986); Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264-65 (2d Cir. 1984).
105. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 274 (2d Cir.
1986); Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984); Gearhart Indus.,
Inc. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 720 (5th Cir. 1984); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638
F.2d 357, 384 (2d Cir. 1980); Horowitz v. Southwest Forest Indus., Inc. 604 F. Supp. 1130,
1134 (D. Nev. 1985).
106. Auerbach v. Bennett, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 929, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002-03 (1979).
107. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 274 (2d Cir.
1986).
108. Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 267 (2d Cir. 1984).
109. Id. at 267; Horowitz v. Southwest Forest Indus., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1130, 1134 (D.
Nev. 1985).
110. Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 719 (5th Cir. 1984).
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not be based upon a personal desire to retain the prerogatives of cor-
porate office."1
The placement of primary emphasis on the fiduciary duties of
directors, when applying the business judgment rule to their takeover
decisions, is consistent with the manner in which the courts have tra-
ditionally applied the rule to ordinary commercial decisions made by
directors."' However, in recent takeover cases, the courts have indi-
cated an increased willingness to be more rigorous and exacting in
their analyses of directorial conduct. In addition, although these re-
cent cases are purportedly decided within the conventional frame-
work of the business judgment rule, the opinions of the courts raise
considerations and concerns not discussed in orthodox business judg-
ment analyses.
A. A Rejuvenated Duty of Loyalty
The case of Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc.113 merits detailed
examination as one of the first judicial efforts to resuscitate the busi-
ness judgment rule when applied in the context of a takeover. During
January of 1984, Piezo Electric Products, Inc., in conjunction with
the investment banking firm of Rooney, Pace Inc., purchased thirty-
two percent of the common stock of Norlin Corporation. Fearing
that a takeover attempt was imminent, Norlin immediately filed suit
against Piezo alleging violations of the federal securities laws and
praying for injunctive relief that would require Piezo to divest itself
of the Norlin stock. Five days after the court denied Norlin's re-
quested injunctive relief, the Norlin board created an employee stock
option plan and trust and appointed as its trustees three of Norlin's
board members. On the same day, the Norlin board authorized the
issuance of 185,000 shares of its common stock to the newly created
trust in consideration for an unsecured promissory note in the
amount of $6,824,945. As a result of this transaction and other con-
temporaneous board transactions involving the issuance of new stock
to a wholly owned and controlled Norlin subsidiary, the incumbent
Norlin board gained voting control of forty-nine percent of the cor-
poration's outstanding stock. The Norlin board then sent a letter to
the corporation's shareholders advising them that the action of the
board was justified by the need to ward off a hostile takeover by a
111. Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 265 (2d Cir. 1984).
112. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 242 (3d ed. 1983).
113. 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984).
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corporate raider having an unsavory reputation. Piezo then instituted
a shareholder's derivative suit against the Norlin directors alleging
that they had breached their fiduciary duties in issuing the new
stock. Piezo sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the Norlin
board from voting the stock under its control.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, applying New York law,
affirmed the trial court's issuance of the requested injunction against
the Norlin board. The board's stock transactions were held not to be
entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule because
Piezo had made a prima facie showing that the Norlin directors
breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty by adopting a defensive take-
over tactic designed to perpetuate the board's control over the corpo-
ration. Given this initial demonstration of self-dealing, the burden
then shifted to the Norlin directors to prove that their actions were
fair and reasonable to the corporation and its shareholders. The
court concluded that the directors failed to discharge this burden
given the timing and nature of their actions.
The Second Circuit had little difficulty finding self-dealing on
the part of the Norlin board. The court noted that when directors, in
the context of a battle for control, precipitously adopt a convoluted
and hastily devised defensive strategy giving the incumbent board
voting control, there is a prima facie showing that the directors acted
out of self-interest in order to solidify their power over the manage-
ment of the corporation.11 In finding this breach of the duty of loy-
alty by the Norlin directors, the court primarily focused upon the
nature and timing of the defensive response, rather than the direc-
tors' apparent lack of a justification for opposing the takeover in the
first place.11 5 This approach requires the court to consider the sub-
stantive merits of the action taken by the board - namely, the im-
pact of the issuance of the new stock upon the control structure of
the corporation. The impact of the new stock issuance in Norlin was
extreme. The public shareholders were permanently divested of vot-
ing control by directorial decision rather than by shareholder
decision.
Thus, the Norlin case can be broadly read to hold that any de-
fensive tactic that effectively insures the continued and permanent
managerial ascendancy of the incumbent board immediately raises a
114. Id. at 265.
115. In Norlin, the court stated: "Where as here, directors amass voting control of close
to a majority of a corporation's shares in their own hands by convoluted and deliberate maneu-
vers, it strains credulity to suggest that retention of control over corporate affairs played no
part in their plans." Id. at 265.
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strong inference of self-dealing on the part of the directors. The
readiness of the Second Circuit to draw such an inference evinces a
greater degree of judicial sensitivity to the realities of a takeover
struggle than is found in previous court decisions. In the past, a
court might have been inclined to give greater credence to the
board's argument that the creation and funding of the trust was for
the laudable and legitimate purpose of benefiting the employees of
the corporation. The court in Norlin, however, summarily rejected
this argument due to the timing and control ramifications of the
board's action.
After concluding that the Norlin directors were not entitled to
the protection of the business judgment rule because of their demon-
strated conflict of interest, the court then addressed the question of
whether the board had carried its burden of establishing the reasona-
bleness and fairness of its action. The court emphasized that the
question of whether the board was justified in its initial decision to
oppose the takeover was entirely separate from the question of
whether the particular defensive measure selected by the board could
be viewed as a reasonable response to the perceived threat posed by
the takeover." 6 The Second Circuit then found that the board's de-
fensive tactic was unfair because it wrested ultimate corporate power
from the hands of the shareholders and put it into the hands of the
directors for the primary purpose of management entrenchment.'
1 7
Under the reasoning of the court in Norlin, it appears that dra-
conian defensive tactics that are hastily adopted in the heat of a bat-
tle for control are inherently suspect. These "win at any cost" defen-
sive measures will be carefully scrutinized in order to determine if
they justify an inference of conflict of interest on the part of the
directors. Even if there are legitimate reasons for opposing a take-
over, the severity of the defensive measures adopted by a board may
still warrant a finding that the directors responded out of a self-in-
dulgent desire to remain in office. The more extreme the response,
the greater the likelihood of such a judicial finding.
A question then arises as to the permissible degree of opposition
that the target directors may mount in order to defeat a tender offer
116. In discussing this point, the Norlin court stated:
But even if Norlin's fears [of the takeover] were legitimate, that would only
help to justify the board's determination that an anticipated takeover should be
opposed as not in the corporation's best interest. It has no relation to our evalua-
tion whether the actions taken by the board in response to that decision were fair
and reasonable.
Id. at 267.
117. Id. at 266-67.
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that is deemed inimical to the best interests of the shareholders. A
clue as to how the court in Norlin would have answered this question
is found in the court's general discussion of the role of the judiciary
in takeover contests. The court opined:
Our most important duty is to protect the fundamental
structure of corporate governance. While the day-to-day affairs
of a company are to be managed by its officers under the super-
vision of directors, decisions affecting a corporation's ultimate
destiny are for the shareholders to make in accordance with
democratic procedures. 18
Accordingly, defensive tactics should be designed to facilitate, rather
than to thwart, the shareholders in the meaningful exercise of their
prerogative to make extraordinary decisions that affect the most ba-
sic aspects of corporate existence. As the ultimate proprietary own-
ers, the shareholders have the inherent right to make such deci-
sions.119 The Norlin board, however, adopted a defensive strategy
that totally usurped the basic right of the shareholders to effect
changes in control either through the acceptance of a tender offer or,
for that matter, through having the voting power to oust the incum-
bent board. Unlike the Norlin board, a board should adopt more
finely tuned defensive measures that are designed to discourage only
tender offers that are inadequately priced or that portend harm to
the corporation. In short, defensive measures should be employed
only if they meet the requirements of a criteria cast in terms of pro-
tecting shareholder rights and promoting shareholder welfare.
118. Id. at 258.
119. The statutes of several states recognize these fundamental rights of shareholders. In
the traditional areas of fundamental corporate change such as charter amendments, sale of
assets, mergers, consolidations and dissolution, director action initiating such changes is merely
a prerequisite to the ultimate disposition of such matters by the shareholders. See, e.g., Cali-
fornia: charter amendments, CAL. CORP. CODE § 903(a) (West 1977); sale of assets, CAL.
CORP. CODE § 1001(a)(2) (West Supp. 1986); mergers, consolidations, and reorganizations,
CAL. CORP. CODE § 1201(a) (West Supp. 1986); dissolution, CAL. CORP. CODE § 2000(a)
(West Supp. 1986); Delaware: charter amendments, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 5242(b) (1983);
mergers, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251(b), 252(c), 253(a), 254(d) (Supp. 1985); sale of
assets, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271(a), dissolution, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 275(a) (Supp.
1985); New York: charter amendments, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 803(a) (McKinney 1986);
sale of assets, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 909(a)(3) (McKinney 1986); mergers and consolida-
tions, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 903(a) (McKinney 1986); dissolution, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §
1002(a) (McKinney 1986); Ohio: charter amendments, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.71
(Baldwin 1986); sale of assets, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.76(a) (Baldwin 1986); mergers
and consolidations, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.81 (Baldwin 1986)(a); dissolution, OHIo
REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.86 (Baldwin 1986).
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B. A Rejuvenated Duty of Care
While the Norlin case was decided upon the basis of the direc-
tors' duty of loyalty in implementing a particular defensive strata-
gem, the case of Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc.'
involved the consideration of the directors' companion duty of care
in formulating a defensive response to an attempted takeover. As in
Norlin, the court in Hanson applied New York law and initially em-
ployed the traditional rhetoric of a business judgment rule analysis
before raising some non-traditional concerns.
The facts of Hanson are important in order to understand the
court's decision and, therefore, must be set forth in some detail. In
August 1985, Hanson Trust announced an unsolicited cash tender
offer of $60 per share for all of SCM Corporation's stock, which was
then trading for less than $50 per share. SCM refused Hanson
Trust's offer to enter into negotiations that might lead to an amica-
ble acquisition. Instead, at the urging of the SCM officers and with
the concurrence of the SCM board, a leveraged buyout and merger
agreement was negotiated by SCM with Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen-
ner & Smith, a noted investment banking firm. Under this agree-
ment, Merrill Lynch would make a competing offer, valued at $70
per share, for the SCM stock.'21 It was contemplated that an SCM
management group would receive equity participation rights of up to
fifteen percent in this leveraged buy-out and merger. When Hanson
Trust subsequently increased its tender offer from $60 to $72 per
share, SCM and Merrill Lynch announced the termination of Mer-
rill Lynch's $70 leveraged buy-out offer.
SCM's management then negotiated a second leveraged buyout
120. 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1968).
121. In a typical leveraged buy-out, a group of investors will form a shell-type acquisi-
tion corporation that will then buy an operating company from its public shareholders. The
acquisition corporation will obtain its financing from a combination of bank loans and high-
yield, high-risk "junk" securities that are sold to the investor group. The investor group gener-
ally includes the investment banking firm that structured the transaction, the management of
the operating company being bought out, and financial institutions such as insurance compa-
nies, pension funds and endowments. Upon completion of the buy-out, the now debt-ridden
acquiring corporation will merge with the acquired operating company, thereby making the
assets of the operating company available as collateral for the bank loans. The bank debt of
the resulting corporation will then be retired from income generated by the operating assets of
the acquired company and frequently from the proceeds of sale from some of its assets. Even-
tually, after most of the bank debt is retired, the acquired company is likely to be sold again to
the public or to another company giving the members of the original buy-out group the oppor-
tunity to realize a not infrequently substantial profit. See R. HAMILTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF
MODERN BUSINESS § 17.16 (1989); Anders, Many Firms Go Public Within a Few Years of
Leveraged Buy Out, Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1987, at 1, col. 6; Williams, Leverage Leader, King of
the Buy Outs, Kohlberg Kravis Helps Alter Corporate U.S., Wall St. J., Apr. 11, 1986, at 1,
col. 6.
93 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW WINTER 1989
agreement with Merrill Lynch in which an offer valued at $74 per
share would be made by Merrill Lynch for the SCM stock. As a
condition to remaining in the bidding contest, Merrill Lynch insisted
upon and was granted a lock-up option. This lock-up option would
allow Merrill Lynch to purchase at a very favorable price SCM's
two most profitable component businesses, which had generated fifty
percent of SCM's net operating revenues in recent years.122 The op-
tion was exercisable by Merrill Lynch if a third party, such as Han-
son Trust, acquired one third or more of SCM's outstanding shares.
Since New York law required mergers to be approved by a vote of
two-thirds of the shareholders, 23 any third party, such as Hanson
Trust, acquiring one-third or more of SCM's shares would then be in
a position to block the contemplated SCM merger with Merrill
Lynch. Thus, if Hanson Trust acquired, under its tender offer, a suf-
ficient amount of SCM stock to block the desired Merrill Lynch
merger, Merrill Lynch could still financially benefit by exercising its
favorably priced lock-up option. This feature provided Merrill
Lynch, as SCM's favored suitor, a strong incentive to remain in the
bidding contest. On the other hand, the possibility that SCM might
lose, through the exercise of the option, two of its most valuable as-
sets to Merrill Lynch for a minimal consideration rendered SCM a
considerably less attractive acquisition candidate from Hanson
Trust's point of view. As a result, the lock-up option might prompt
Hanson Trust to withdraw from the bidding contest altogether.
On September 10, 1985, the SCM board, consisting only of the
nine outside directors of the twelve member board, met and learned
for the first time of the proposed second leveraged buyout and
merger agreement with Merrill Lynch and the proposed option. The
meeting was convened at nine o'clock in the evening and lasted for
three hours. A representative of Goldman Sachs & Company,
SCM's investment banker, advised the board that the lock-up option
price was "within the range of fair value," although he did not state
what that range might be. 24 In fact, unknown to the board,
122. In the context of a hostile takeover struggle, the target corporation may grant a
lock-up option to a favored suitor to purchase a valuable asset of the corporation at a favorable
price. Such an option provides an incentive to the favored suitor to enter or remain in the
bidding contest as well as an assured benefit should its bid fail. The lock-up option often will
discourage further bidding by the hostile bidder because the favored suitor's exercise of the
option on its favorable price terms will make the target a financially less attractive acquisition
candidate. See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 276 (2d Cir.
1986); R. CLARKE, CORPORATE LAW § 13.6 (1986).
123. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 903(a)(2) (McKinney 1986).
124. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 271 (2d Cir.
1986).
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Goldman Sachs had never calculated the fair value of the two busi-
nesses covered by the option. No member of the board made any
inquiries as to the value of the optioned assets. No documents or
even pro forma financial statements were distributed to the directors
and none were requested by them. Goldman Sachs did state, how-
ever, that SCM could undoubtedly obtain a higher price for each of
the two optioned businesses if an orderly sale were conducted. In
addition, there was no discussion among the directors as to the effect
that the sale of SCM's most profitable businesses would have upon
its future operations. Although a week remained before Hanson
Trust might actually acquire one-third or more of the SCM stock
under its tender offer and thereby be in a position to block a Merrill
Lynch merger, none of the SCM directors suggested postponing the
decision on the lock-up option for further consideration. SCM's
outside directors then voted unanimously to approve both the lever-
aged buyout by Merrill Lynch at $74 per share and the lock-up
option.
The following day, Hanson Trust announced the termination of
its $72 cash tender offer. Shortly thereafter, Hanson Trust declared
its intention to make a $75 cash tender offer conditioned upon the
judicial invalidation of the lock-up option granted to Merrill Lynch.
Hanson Trust then sought a preliminary injunction enjoining the ex-
ercise of the option. In the evidentiary hearing before the district
court, there was considerable evidence that the approval of the op-
tion price by the SCM board had been based upon a serious under-
valuation of the two businesses to be sold. These businesses, which
generated one half of SCM's income, could be purchased by Merrill
Lynch under its option for $430 million, only one third of the total
purchase price of SCM which would be paid by Merrill Lynch under
its leveraged buyout offer.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that Hanson Trust
was entitled to a preliminary injunction barring the exercise of the
lock-up option. The decision of the SCM board to grant the option
was held not to be shielded by the business judgment rule because
Hanson Trust had made a prima facie showing that the SCM direc-
tors had breached their fiduciary duty of care by employing a faulty
deliberative process in making their decision. As a result, the burden
then shifted to the SCM directors to prove that their actions were
fair and reasonable to the corporation and its shareholders. The
court concluded that the directors had been unable to discharge this
burden given the patent inadequacy of the lock-up option price.
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In the first phase of its two-part analysis, the court in Hanson
considered whether the SCM directors had breached their fiduciary
duty of care. A number of factors were cited by the court to support
its conclusion that the SCM directors had, in fact, breached their
duty of care by failing to consider reasonably available material in-
formation, as well as failing to exercise vigilance in overseeing its
expert financial advisors."2 5 First, the court indicated that the swift-
ness with which the board acted at its hastily convened meeting sug-
gested inadequate consultative procedures. The court emphasized
that the time frame within which action had to be taken would have
permitted a more extended consideration of the option. Second, the
court noted that the board's unquestioning reliance upon the con-
clusory opinions of its financial experts evidenced imprudence. In re-
gard to this factor, the court stated that a board, before acting upon
the basis of an expert's opinion, has an obligation to investigate and
evaluate the adequacy of the substantive bases for that opinion. 26
When presented with an undocumented opinion, directors should ask
sufficiently probing questions of the expert so as to determine the
degree to which they may justifiably rely upon that opinion. Finally,
the court indicated that the directors should have inquired about the
financial ramifications that the exercise of the lock-up option would
have upon the corporation's ability to remain a viable business en-
tity. Given the cumulative effect of all these factors, the court con-
cluded that there was such a paucity of basic financial data before
the board that the directors were incapable of making an informed
decision with respect to the lock-up option.' 27
125. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 274-75 (2d Cir.
1986). The court also concluded:
The proper exercise of due care by a director in informing himself of mate-
rial information and in overseeing the outside advice on which he might appro-
priately rely is of necessity, a pre-condition to performing his ultimate duty of
acting in good faith to protect the best interests of the corporation.
Id. at 276.
126. In holding that directors may not blindly rely upon the opinions of even acknowl-
edged experts, the court in Hanson stated:
In general, directors have some oversight obligation to become reasonably
familiar with an opinion, report, or other source of advice before becoming enti-
tled to rely on it. In our view, the test of reasonableness should suffice with
respect to the area of expertise relied upon, whether that area be legal or
financial.
Id. at 275.
127. An increasing number of courts have begun to emphasize that in order to invoke
the business judgment rule, directors have a duty to inform themselves, prior to making a
decision, of all material information reasonably available to them. See. e.g., Buckhorn, Inc. v.
Ropak Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209, 230 (S.D. Ohio 1987); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858,
872 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1985); MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1247 (Del. Ch. 1985), affid, 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
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The mode of reasoning employed by the court in Hanson de-
parted in several significant respects from that used in an orthodox
duty of care analysis under the business judgment rule. In discussing
the scope of its inquiry, the Second Circuit stated that "while direc-
tors are protected to the extent that their actions evidence their busi-
ness judgment, such protection assumes that courts must not reflex-
ively decline to consider the content of their 'judgment' and the
extent of the information on which it is based." '1 8 Under this view,
courts, at least in takeover cases, may examine the substantive con-
tent of a directorial decision in order to determine if it may be re-
garded as an informed decision meeting the standards of the fiduci-
ary duty of care. Prior to Hanson, duty of care inquiries had been
limited to an examination of the adequacy of the information gather-
ing techniques and the appropriateness of the methodologies em-
ployed by the directors in reaching their decision. 29 The substantive
content of a decision properly made, however, had not been consid-
ered a proper subject for judicial scrutiny. 30
In Hanson, the Second Circuit only indicated in very broad
terms the duty of care criteria to be employed by a court when ex-
amining the substantive merits of a particular defensive tactic
adopted by a target board in a takeover struggle. The court initially
noted that even if a takeover attempt is found not to be in the best
interests of the corporation, the board "does not hold a blank check
to use all possible strategies to forestall the acquisition moves." '' By
this caveat, the court appears to implicitly recognize that the partic-
1986); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1075 (Del. Ch.), affd, 500 A.2d 1346
(Del. 1985). Some states have now adopted legislation allowing corporations, through the in-
clusion of an appropriate provision in their articles of incorporation, to eliminate or limit the
personal liability of their directors for monetary damages for breach of their fiduciary duty of
care under certain circumstances. Delaware adopted such legislation in 1986 and it has served
as a prototype for comparable enactments in other states. See Veasey, Finkelstein & Bigler,
Delaware Supports Directors with a Three-Legged Stool of Limited Liability, Indemnification
and Insurance, 42 Bus. LAW. 399 (1987). For a survey and analysis of the different types of
state legislation recently enacted to reduce the risk of directors being held personally liable for
money damages, see Hanks, Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and Officer Lia-
bility Limitation and Indemnification, 43 Bus. LAW 1207 (1988).
128. Hanson Trust PLC v. MCL SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 275 (2d Cir.
1986), (emphasis in original).
129. Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 634, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002-03, 419
N.Y.S.2d 920, 928-29 (1979).
130. In discussing a duty of care analysis, the New York Court of Appeals stated that
"[w]hile the court may properly inquire as to the adequacy and appropriateness of the com-
mittee's investigative procedures and methodologies, it may not under the guise of considera-
tion of such factors trespass in the domain of business judgment." Id. at 634, 393 N.E.2d at
1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 929.
131. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273 (2d Cir.
1986).
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ular defensive response selected by a target board must be substan-
tively reasonable in relation to the perceived threat posed by the
takeover attempt." 2 In the opinion of the Second Circuit, an exam-
ple of an unreasonable defensive response would be a lock-up option
that is so minimally priced as to "effectively preclude [other] bidders
from competing with the optionee bidder."13 The proper function of
a lock-up option is to provide the optionee with a bargain as an in-
centive to either enter or remain in the bidding contest. 134 This func-
tion is not served, however, if the option price is set so low as to
cause other bidders to withdraw from the contest out of fear that the
exercise of the option would strip the corporation of its most valuable
assets for a totally inadequate consideration.
Under the foregoing duty of care analysis, business judgment
rule protection would presumably be denied to any board that em-
ployed a defensive tactic that effectively foreclosed further bidding
by one of several parties in an active bidding contest. Supporting this
view, the court in Hanson stated that "the role of the court in an
action to enjoin takeover measures is to allow the forces of the free
market to determine the outcome to the greatest extent possible
within the bounds of the law."' 36 In the context of a free market, the
shareholders normally determine questions of corporate control by
being allowed, freely and without unwarranted director intervention,
to receive and decide between competing bids in an active bidding
contest.
The court in Hanson completed its duty of care analysis by con-
sidering the sufficiency of the option price, both from the point of
view of the financial welfare of the shareholders, and from the point
of view of the competing bidders' willingness to remain in the bid-
ding contest. 36 The court concluded that when the proposed option
price on its face raises questions as to its adequacy and, in addition,
the financial opinions rendered by the board's experts can at best be
characterized as equivocal, the directors are under a heightened duty
of care to subject the proposed option to a substantial degree of anal-
ysis."13 In holding that the directors failed to fulfill this duty, the
132. As will subsequently be discussed, the Supreme Court of Delaware has explicitly
made this requirement of reasonableness of response an integral part of its criteria for applying
the business judgment rule. See infra text accompanying notes 159-60.
133. Hanson Trust PLC, 781 F.2d at 274.
134. Id. at 276.
135. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 274 (2d Cir.
1986).
136. Id. at 276-77.
137. The court in Hanson also recognized that conflict of interest problems arise in a
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court stated:
[The directors] do not appear to have pursued adequately
their obligation to ensure the shareholders' fundamental right to
make the "decisions affecting [the] corporation's ultimate
destiny," as required by their duty of care.
...As the district court found, the Board "knew or should
have known" that its approval of the Asset Option Agreement
would effectively foreclose further bidding for SCM. s
Thus, the Hanson case can be interpreted as holding that if an anti-
takeover measure adopted by a board of directors effectively
preempts the fundamental right of the shareholders to make control
decisions determining the ultimate destiny of the corporation, then
the directors have breached their duty of care and bear the burden
of proving the fairness of the transaction.
Turning to the second phase of its two-part analysis, the court
in Hanson considered whether the SCM directors had carried their
burden of establishing the fairness of the lock-up transaction. After
an extensive examination of the financial merits of the transaction,
the court concluded that the evidence indicated that the directors
had significantly undervalued the optioned assets when setting the
option price to be paid by Merrill Lynch.""9 As a result, the SCM
shareholders were subjected to the considerable risk that there would
be a transfer of one-half of the corporation for an inadequate consid-
eration in the event Merrill Lynch exercised the option. The court
found this to be unfair to the shareholders regardless of the motives
of the directors in authorizing the option. Although there may have
been legitimate reasons for the SCM board's opposition to the take-
over, a defensive measure, such as a lock-up option, will still be re-
garded as unfair when its implementation compromises the financial
welfare of the corporation and thereby the shareholders.' 0 The court
leveraged buy out in which management will personally participate. This factor also heightens
the directors' duty of care. The court stated that "[i]n the context of a self-interested manage-
ment proposing a defensive LBO, the independent directors have an important duty to protect
shareholder interests, as it would be unreasonable to expect management, with financial expec-
tancies in an LBO fully to represent the shareholders." Id. at 277.
138. Id. at 277 (citations omitted).
139. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 281 (2d Cir.
1986).
140. In discussing the fairness of defensive tactics, the court stated: "A director's obliga-
tion to protect the financial interests of the corporation, and thereby the shareholders may not
be compromised by a competing interest in other legitimate corporate purposes, such as fend-
ing off a hostile takeover bid. When engaging in defensive maneuvers, such as a lock-up op-
tion, a director's primary objective is to ensure the overall fairness, including a fair option
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thus suggested that the primary role of directors should be to pro-
mote the economic interests of the shareholders and that these inter-
ests may not be sacrificed in an effort to win a takeover battle at any
cost.
The Second Circuit also found that the defensive tactic selected
by the SCM directors was substantively unfair because it coerced
the SCM shareholders into tendering their shares to one of the two
actively competing bidders. 41 The option price was set so low as to
force SCM shareholders into tendering to Merrill Lynch out of fear
that otherwise Hanson Trust might acquire one-third of the shares
and thereby trigger the exercise of Merrill Lynch's option. SCM
would then face the dubious financial prospect of being stripped of
its most valuable assets for an insufficient consideration. The threat
of SCM losing two of its most productive component businesses
might also prompt Hanson Trust to withdraw from the bidding con-
test. The court indicated that a defensive measure, in order to be
fair, ought to facilitate ongoing competitive bidding, not foreclose
it.
42
By effectively ending competitive bidding and by coercing the
shareholders to tender to Merrill Lynch, the lock-up option was
viewed by the court as impinging upon the right of the SCM share-
holders to make the decisions that affect fundamental corporate gov-
ernance. The court stated that "[the lock-up option] serves as the
means by which SCM's managers and directors could wrest from the
shareholders the power to make the independent ownership choices
• .. [which are] the prerogative of shareholders alone, 'in accor-
dance with democratic procedures.' "143 Finally, the court concluded
by reaffirming its belief that market forces should be "permitted to
determine the outcome of [the] contest. '"1
4
The Hanson decision is noteworthy for its insistence upon safe-
guarding the basic prerogatives of shareholders in takeover contests
when directors try to invoke the business judgment rule as justifica-
tion for their defensive tactics. By contrast, an orthodox business
judgment rule analysis tends to place greater emphasis upon safe-
guarding the rights of the directors to make their decisions without
being subjected to second guessing by the courts. In all phases of its
business judgment rule analysis, the reasoning of the Hanson court
price, to the shareholders." Id. at 277-78 (citation omitted).
141. Id. at 282.
142. Id. at 281.
143. Id. at 282 (citations omitted and emphasis in original).
144. id, at 283.
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was consciously undergirded by the imperative that the primary role
of the judiciary in takeover battles is to preserve the basic structure
of corporate governance wherein shareholders will normally make
the elemental decisions involving ownership and control. As such,
common criteria and concerns are found in both phases of the court's
analysis - the initial duty of care analysis and the subsequent fair-
ness analysis. Most significantly, the court evidenced a willingness in
its initial duty of care analysis to take into consideration the substan-
tive fairness of the defensive measure adopted by the directors. This
blurring and blending of the traditionally distinct two analytical
phases of the business judgment rule raises questions as to whether
the business judgment rule, as thus applied in Hanson, can remain a
viable tool for orderly and reasoned judicial analysis in takeover
cases.
XII. The Viability of the Traditional Business Judgment Rule as a
Standard of Review
As the foregoing discussion indicates, the courts have begun to
encounter analytic difficulties as they seek to invigorate the tradi-
tional business judgment rule in order to meet the particular
problems posed by target directors mounting defenses in corporate
control struggles. These difficulties raise the question of whether the
rule provides an appropriate starting point for the evaluation of di-
rectorial conduct in the specialized context of a hostile takeover bat-
tle. The business judgment rule was initially developed in order to
insulate from judicial scrutiny the various commercial decisions
made by directors in conducting the profit-making activities of a cor-
poration. " 5 Courts were reluctant to review the acts of directors in
business situations where the commercial expertise of the directors
was thought to be greater than that of the courts.1"6 This judicial
self-restraint had as its purpose the stimulation of risk-taking, inno-
vation, and other creative entrepreneurial activities that would en-
hance the profit-making capability of corporations.4 Thus, the pro-
tected directorial decisions were those that concerned the functioning
of the corporation as it sought to make a profit in a competitive busi-
145. Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 300 (3d Cir. 1980) (Rosenn, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981); Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252,
1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
146. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 300 (7th Cir. 1981) (Cudahy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); AC Acquisitions v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519
A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986).
147. See Hearings. supra note 8, at 352 (Proposal of Bevis Longstreth).
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ness environment.
Directorial decisions regarding anti-takeover measures are fun-
damentally different than the recurrent and routine business deci-
sions made by directors. Corporate control decisions are made infre-
quently and primarily affect the corporation-shareholder
relationship. Such decisions only secondarily affect the ordinary busi-
ness operations of a corporation. 14 8 In addition, anti-takeover defen-
sive tactics, by their very nature, often act as a restraint on the
profit-making capability of the target corporation. 49 The implemen-
tation of defensive measures frequently requires a corporation to
make large expenditures financed by massive borrowings that may
hinder the corporation in the future conduct of its commercial opera-
tions.' 5 Given the unique character of defensive decisions and the
relative infrequency with which they are made, the avowed commer-
cial purposes of the business judgment rule do not appear to be fur-
thered by applying the rule to such decisions.
The hallmark of the business judgment rule is the initial pre-
sumption of propriety accorded directors in the exercise of their
managerial powers. Judicial deference to board decisions is justified
by a reasonable expectation that, in most instances, grounds will not
exist for doubting the integrity of the board's decision-making pro-
cess. Some courts have recognized, however, that there is no reasona-
ble basis for such an expectation in the case of a board responding to
a challenge to its continued control of a corporation. In deciding
whether to adopt anti-takeover measures, directors of a target corpo-
ration are inherently afflicted with a conflict of interest that makes
an objective decision on their part difficult. 5 ' There is an ever-pre-
sent risk that the dynamics of the board's deliberative process may
be, consciously or subconsciously, tainted by a self-indulgent desire
on the part of the directors to remain in office. A former member of
the Securities and Exchange Commission commented upon this phe-
nomenon as follows:
In the context of changes of ownership and control, the
148. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 299-300 (7th Cir. 1981) (Cudahy,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
149. Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
151. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1986); Panter
v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 300-01 (7th Cir.) (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946, 1954-55 (Del. 1985); AC Acquisitions v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103,
111 (Del. Ch. 1986); Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (1964).
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question is whether management's interest in preserving its con-
trol position is large enough to skew its judgment . . . to the
detriment of the corporation . . . .Human nature suggests, and
the behavior of many target managements confirms, that per-
sonal interest plays a major and often dominant role in battles
for corporate ownership and control. 52
There appears to be an inherent danger that directors will in-
stinctively resist, regardless of merit, a hostile tender offer that, if
successful, would result in their being ousted from office.153 No one
enjoys the ignominy of being fired. Directors understandably are in-
terested in maintaining their public reputation for effective corporate
stewardship against claims of raiders who contend that they can do
better. 1" Successful resistance to a tender offer may, therefore, be
viewed by the directors as a public means of vindicating their chal-
lenged competency to manage the target corporation. In addition,
there is also the possibility that the resisting directors may be influ-
enced unduly by a purely personal desire to maintain their positions
of power, prestige and prominence as directors of a major corpora-
tion. 155 Given these realities, defensive directorial decisions appear to
warrant a more stringent form of judicial review than the one cur-
rently afforded by the business judgment rule with its automatic ini-
tial presumption of propriety. 56
XIII. Judicial Attempts to Reconstruct the Traditional Business
Judgment Rule
In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,' 57 the Supreme Court
of Delaware specifically recognized that the business judgment rule,
152. Hearings, supra note 8, at 353 (Proposal of Bevis Longstreth).
153. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 254, 256 (7th Cir. 1986); see
Gelford & Sebastian, Reevaluating the Duties of Target Management in the Hostile Tender
Offer, 60 B.U. L. REv. 403, 435-37 (1980).
154. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 301 (7th Cir.) (Cudahy, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
155. Id.
156. A more intense form of judicial review for anti-takeover decisions will exact a
price. One court has commented upon this phenomenon as follows:
[A] more searching judicial review of corporate decisions concerning defen-
sive measures to takeovers . . . is not without its costs. It makes directors over-
cautious, makes people reluctant to serve as directors, drives up directors' fees
and officers' and directors' liability insurance rates, and leads boards of directors
to adopt ponderous court-like procedures. But the price is one the courts have
been willing to pay.
Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1986).
157. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). In deciding the Unocal case, the Supreme Court of
Delaware relied heavily-upon Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964), an
earlier decision dealing with anti-takeover measures.
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in its traditional form, does not provide an appropriate standard of
review for directorial decisions authorizing defensive measures to re-
pel attempted takeovers. The court stated that when a board takes
action designed to thwart a threatened challenge to its continued
control of the corporation, there is "the omnipresent specter that
• .. [the] board may be acting primarily in its own interest, rather
than those of the corporation and its shareholders. 15  Because of the
potential for self-interest to dominate the board's deliberative pro-
cess, the court concluded that anti-takeover decisions do not warrant
the automatic judicial deference conferred by the traditional busi-
ness judgment rule with its initial presumption of propriety. Accord-
ingly, the court in Unocal reordered the basic operation of the busi-
ness judgment rule by shifting the burdens of proof to provide a
more flexible and more intense form of judicial review in hostile
takeover cases.
Under the Delaware approach, the burdens of proof on two very
basic issues are initially placed upon the directors before they can
invoke the protection of a presumption of propriety for their authori-
zation of anti-takeover measures.16 9 First, the directors must affirma-
tively demonstrate that they had reasonable grounds for concluding
that the threatened takeover posed a danger to corporate policy and
effectiveness. Satisfaction of this burden is designed to provide assur-
ance that the directors had bona fide reasons for their basic decision
to mount some form of opposition to the takeover. Second, the direc-
tors must affirmatively demonstrate that the defensive tactic they se-
lected was reasonable in relation to the threat posed by the takeover.
In determining whether the directors have discharged these burdens
of proof, the Delaware courts have held that the quality of the evi-
dence presented by the board is materially enhanced when a major-
ity of the board authorizing the challenged action consists of outside,
independent directors. 160
158. Unocal Corp. v Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
159. See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256, 257 (7th Cir.
1986); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341 (Del. 1987); Polk v.
Good, 507 A.2d 531, 537 (Del. 1986); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,
506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del.
1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985); AC Acquisitions
v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111-12 (Del. Ch. 1986); Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del.
Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964). Courts of other jurisdictions have also adopted Delaware's
reformulated version of the business judgment rule when evaluating the actions of directors in
adopting defensive measures. See Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 562 F. Supp. 829, 845 (D.
Minn. 1986) (applying Minnesota law).
160. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1343 (Del. 1987);
Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 537 (Del. 1986); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346,
1356 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
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Under the Delaware approach, once directors have discharged
their initial burdens of proof, they earn the traditional protection of
the business judgment rule. The burden then shifts back to the plain-
tiff who challenged the board's action to bear the ultimate burden of
persuasion by showing a breach by the directors of their fiduciary
duties. 1 In order to prevail, the challenger must show by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the decision of the directors was pri-
marily based on a self-indulgent desire to remain in office or some
other breach of fiduciary duty such as fraud, overreaching, lack of
good faith, or being uninformed."'2
A. The First Burden: Establishing the Existence of a Threat to
the Corporate Enterprise
A more detailed examination of the reformulated business judg-
ment rule established in Unocal quickly reveals a considerably more
stringent and searching standard of review for a board's anti-take-
over decisions. Before being entitled to a presumption of propriety, a
board must first show that it had reasonable grounds for believing
that the takeover posed a harmful threat to the corporate enterprise.
Directors have been held to satisfy this burden by demonstrating
that their decision to oppose an unsolicited tender offer was made in
good faith and after a reasonable investigation. 1 3 By requiring the
directors to analyze the nature of a takeover bid and its effect upon
the corporation, the Delaware courts appear to be reaffirming their
long held view that only informed directorial decisions are entitled to
receive judicial deference.1 64
At the same time, however, the court in Unocal significantly
changed the manner in which the adequacy of a board's deliberative
process should be judicially evaluated. By initially requiring the
board to show that its proceedings were conducted in a knowledgea-
ble and reasoned manner, the Unocal court has placed the burden of
proof upon the directors to demonstrate that they complied with
161. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985).
162. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985). Presumably,
if the directors are found to have breached their fiduciary duties, they are only able to sustain
their action through a demonstration that it was objectively or intrinsically fair. See AC Ac-
quisitions v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 115 (Del. 1986).
163. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341 (Del. 1987);
Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 537 (Del. 1986); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Hold-
ings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986); Moran v. Household
Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d
946, 955 (Del. 1985); Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964).
164. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985).
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their fiduciary duty of care in making their decision to oppose a
takeover.16 In contrast, under a traditional business judgment rule
analysis, the party challenging the board's decision would initially
bear the burden of proving the directors' breach of this fiduciary
duty.
1 66
The Delaware courts have shown flexibility when applying the
first phase of their revised version of the business judgment rule. In
determining whether the directors demonstrated good faith and rea-
sonable investigation, the Delaware courts have deemed the first bur-
den of proof to be satisfied by a general showing that there was a
reasonable basis for the board to have concluded that the implemen-
tation of their defensive measure served a proper corporate purpose
and not a purpose personal to the directors. 117 Thus, board resistance
to a takeover can find its ultimate justification through a showing
that the best interests of the shareholders will thereby be served." 8
A body of case law is now developing in which the Delaware
courts have indicated the types of factors upon which the board may
appropriately predicate its resistance to an attempted takeover. The
Delaware courts have held that board opposition to a takeover is
warranted when there are reasonable grounds for believing that a
two-tier tender offer made by a hostile suitor is both inadequately
priced and so structured that its acceptance by the target sharehold-
ers will essentially be coerced. 169 Such tender offers are viewed as
harmful because they are in derogation of the proprietary preroga-
tives of the shareholders to freely make change of ownership deci-
sions with respect to their investments. Moreover, directors have
been permitted to adopt prospective defensive measures, such as
165. Under Delaware law, a gross negligence standard is employed in determining
whether directors have adequately informed themselves prior to the making of a decision.
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
166. See supra text accompanying notes 75-80.
167. AC Acquisitions v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 112 (Del. Ch. 1986).
In the Unocal case, the Supreme Court of Delaware stated:
The standard of proof. . . [recognized herein] is designed to ensure that a
defensive measure to thwart or impede a takeover is indeed motivated by a good
faith concern for the welfare of the corporation and its stockholders, which in all
circumstances must be free of any fraud or other misconduct.
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
168. In discussing the fiduciary duties of directors in approving a takeover, the Supreme
Court of Delaware has repeatedly emphasized that the board may only take defensive action
when the best interests of the shareholders requires them to do so. Thus, the court has stated:
"In the board's exercise of corporate power to forestall a takeover bid our analysis begins with
the basic principle that corporate directors have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of
the Corporation's stockholders." Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955
(Del. 1985).
169. Id. a 955-56. For a discussion of two-tier tender offers, see supra notes 25.
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poison pill plans, when there is a reasonable basis for concluding that
current market conditions are conducive to a coercive two-tier tender
offer being made at some future time.170 The courts have also found
that a bona fide threat to a corporation's policies and effectiveness
exists when it appears that a successful takeover for an inadequate
consideration will be followed by a break-up and sale of the corpora-
tion.' 7 ' Similarly, a legitimate basis for opposing a takeover exists
when the directors of a target corporation have a good faith belief
that the costs of a hostile acquisition will ultimately be financed by
the dismemberment and sale of major divisions of their corporation,
which employ thousands of workers.17 1 Under this view, a defensive
170. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985). Poison pill plans
are designed to deter persons seeking to acquire substantial or controlling shareholdings di-
rectly from a target corporation's stockholders without first obtaining the prior approval of the
target's board of directors. Under a typical plan, the target of an anticipated takeover might
issue redeemable stock purchase warrants to its shareholders. This "poison pill" would then be
activated and the warrants would become non-redeemable and exercisable upon the occurrence
of certain stipulated triggering events. One common provision would allow the warrant holder,
other than the hostile bidder, to purchase stock in the target corporation at half its market
value in the event the hostile bidder acquires a specified percentage of the target's stock (e.g.
20%) or commences a tender offer for a specified percentage of the target's stock (e.g., 30%).
Another common provision would allow the warrant holder to purchase stock in the acquiring
corporation at half its market value in the event there is a merger or business combination
between the acquiring corporation and the target corporation. Until the warrants become exer-
cisable, they are normally redeemable by the board of directors of the target corporation at a
nominal cost.
Still other poison pill plans might, instead of involving stock purchases, involve the target
shareholders exchanging their stock for premium priced debt securities of the target, thereby
increasing corporate indebtedness and making the target a less attractive acquisition candi-
date. The object of all these plans is to make the consummation of an acquisition by an unso-
licited suitor, particularly those employing a two-tier tender offer, more costly and thereby
force the suitor to negotiate initially with the target board for the redemption of the warrants
before attempting an acquisition. Given its enhanced bargaining power, the target board will
presumably vigorously negotiate on behalf of its shareholders fairer and higher offers for their
shares. On the other hand, critics of poison pill plans argue that the board may use their
enhanced power to effectively prevent shareholders from even considering a meritorious take-
over offer that the board opposes. See R. HAMILTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN BUSINESS §
17.13 (1989); Concept Release on Takeovers and Contests for Corporate Control: Advance
Notice of Possible Commission Actions, Exchange Act Release No. 23,486, [1986-1987 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,018, at 88,203-06 (July 31, 1986); Fleischer &
Golder, Poison Pill, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 24, 1986, at 17, col. 2.
171. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180-81 (Del.
1986). In determining whether the threat of a takeover poses a danger to corporate policy and
effectiveness, a target board may consider whether the hostile bidder has previously been in-
volved in attempts to acquire and break-up other corporations which resulted in the payment
of "greenmail" or severe restructurings of the target companies. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont
Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1342 (Del. 1987).
172. GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016, 1019-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
In discussing the elements that a board may appropriately consider in reaching a decision to
approve or disapprove a takeover, the court stated:
The exercise of independent honest business judgment of an enlightened and
disinterested Board is the traditional and appropriate way to deal fairly and
even-handedly with both the protection of investments, on the one hand, and the
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measure that is adopted to protect the continued existence of a cor-
poration as an integrated entity represents a reasonable judgment by
the board as to the best interests of shareholders and corporate em-
ployees. Finally, directors also have been permitted to justify the
adoption of defensive tactics by arguing that a challenge for corpo-
rate control would have a disruptive effect on the orderly implemen-
tation of the corporation's previously made business plans and
strategies."7 3
In contrast to the foregoing, courts have rejected arguments by
target directors that certain types of takeover threats justify defen-
sive measures. For example, the mere fact that the hostile bidder, if
successful, will displace existing management does not provide per-
missible grounds for the adoption of defensive tactics. 74 Legitimiz-
ing director resistance on this basis alone would effectively validate
clearly forbidden director self-entrenchment for purely personal rea-
sons. Similarly, the adoption of a defensive measure by a target
board is not justified simply because there is an acrimonious dispute
between the hostile suitor and current management regarding the
general business policies to be pursued by the corporation.' 75 Rather,
such dissension heightens the duty of the incumbent board to care-
fully investigate and evaluate the hostile bid in order to assure that
the personal feelings of the directors will not interfere with their fi-
duciary obligations.
On occasion, target directors have expressly considered non-
shareholder interests in determining whether an attempted takeover
threatened the corporation and therefore merited resistance.' The
Supreme Court of Delaware has sanctioned this practice and has de-
clared that a target board may consider the impact of a takeover "on
'constituencies' other than shareholders (i.e. creditors, customers,
employees, and perhaps even the community generally).' 77 Giving
weight to such considerations, according to the Supreme Court of
Delaware, is appropriate "provided there are rationally related bene-
fits accruing to the stockholders.' 78 In response to the current wave
legitimate concerns and interests of employees and management of a corporation
who service the interests of investors on the other.
Id. at 1020.
173. Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 537 (Del. 1986); Horowitz v. Southwest Forest Indus.,
Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1130, 1135 (D. Nev. 1985).
174. Schilling v. Belcher, 582 F.2d 995, 1004-05 (5th Cir. 1978).
175. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 257-58 (7th Cir. 1986).
176. GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016, 1019-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
177. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
178. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986).
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of hostile acquisitions, some state legislatures have amended their
corporation codes to specifically authorize directors to consider the
interests of groups other than shareholders, thereby statutorily
adopting the Delaware approach. 179
In certain cases, the Delaware courts have shown great ingenu-
ity, if not outright permissiveness, in finding that target directors had
satisfactorily borne their burden of showing that an unsolicited
tender offer placed the corporate enterprise in jeopardy. In AC Ac-
quisitions v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 80 the Delaware Chancery
Court concluded that a fairly priced and non-coercive tender offer
may still constitute a threat because a majority of the target share-
holders might prefer an alternative form of offer containing different
financial features.' 8' Thus, in response to an adequately priced, all
cash, hostile tender offer, a target board may properly authorize a
self-tender offer that is structured to provide the shareholders with
both a substantial cash distribution and a continuing equity interest
in the corporation. By providing the shareholders with a financially
attractive alternative to the fair hostile bid, the target's resistance in
the form of a self-tender offer serves a proper corporate purpose and
therefore satisfies the first of the two burdens of proof placed on a
target board. Although in AC Acquisitions the target's self-tender
was eventually invalidated on other grounds,'82 it should be noted
that if this self-tender had been consummated, it would have effected
179. An example of such legislation is that adopted by Ohio, which states:
For purposes of this section, a director, in determining what he reasonably
believes to be in the best interest of the corporation, shall consider the interests
of the corporation's shareholders and, in his discretion, may consider any of the
following:
(1) The interests of the corporation's employees, suppliers, creditors,
and customers;
(2) The economy of the state and nation;
(3) Community and societal considerations;
(4) The long-term as well as short-term interests of the corporation
and its shareholders, including the possibility that these interests may be
best served by the continued independence of the corporation.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (Baldwin Supp. 1986).
180. 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986).
181. Id. at 112-13.
182. The target directors were held not to be entitled to the protection of the business
judgment rule because of their failure to discharge their required second burden of proof by
establishing that the defensive self-tender offer was reasonable in relation to the threat posed
by the hostile tender offer. The target's self-tender was found to be coercive because it was
structured so that if a shareholder subscribed to the hostile tender offer and this offer was then
terminated because its stated conditions were not met, the shareholder would then be unable to
make a timely tender into the target's self-tender and would thereby be precluded from mak-
ing any profit from either of the two tender offers. Presumably, if the target's self-tender had
not contained this coercive feature as to when a timely tender must be made, it would have
been upheld. See id. at 113-14.
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a major recapitalization of the corporation. Such a recapitalization,
if consummated, would raise questions regarding the propriety of a
board's decision to unilaterally alter the basic structure of their cor-
poration when making a defensive response to an unsolicited, but
fairly priced tender offer.
B. The Second Burden: The Reasonableness of the Defensive
Response
Demonstrating that a chosen defensive tactic is reasonable in
relation to the danger posed by a takeover is the final, and probably
the most difficult hurdle that the target directors must surmount in
order to obtain the protection of a presumption of propriety for their
anti-takeover actions. This phase of the two-pronged Delaware stan-
dard of review addresses the allowable types of resistance that target
directors may mount in response to a potentially harmful takeover.
The judicial development and application of this aspect of the re-
vised business judgment rule is crucial to the development of a
meaningful standard of review.
Depending upon the defensive stratagem selected, board resis-
tance may seek to accomplish quite different results. The particular
defensive tactic employed may have as its objective the defeat of the
current hostile bid, as well as the preclusion of any and all further
hostile bids from any source. For the purposes of this analysis, this
type of massive resistance will be referred to as "preclusionary resis-
tance." Another type of defensive strategy may be designed to defeat
the current hostile bid, but in such a manner that will permit the
hostile suitor to modify the original tender offer in order to eliminate
its objectionable features. This more limited form of defensive action
will be termed "modificatory resistance." Still another form of oppo-
sition might seek to defeat the current hostile bid as well as preclude
any further unsolicited bids from the current hostile suitor. This
highly focused type of resistance will be designated as "selective
preclusionary resistance." The Delaware courts have not yet formu-
lated a comprehensive test for determining the reasonableness of a
defensive response under any given set of circumstances. General
principles, however, which provide guidance in determining the per-
missible forms of resistance, have emerged from their decisions.
1. Preclusionary Resistance.-A defensive measure is fatally
defective if it totally forecloses the possibility of any takeover bids
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ever being made for a corporation.1 88 If a target board is permitted
to render its corporation acquisition-proof by use of some defensive
measure, the directors would be effectively insulated from any form
of market accountability for their stewardship."' Accordingly, such
extreme defensive tactics are held to be primarily designed to perpet-
uate the incumbent directors in office and, therefore, are considered
to be an unreasonable response to any perceived threat that might be
posed by a takeover.185 Target directors are not permitted to pursue
a form of resistance that creates such a blatant conflict of interest on
their part. From this perspective, the requirement that the directors'
defensive response be reasonable is merely a corollary of the direc-
tors' more general duty of loyalty to avoid self-dealing."86 Therefore,
when the directors establish the reasonableness of their response by
demonstrating that self-entrenchment was not their motive, they are
only proving their compliance with their fiduciary duty of loyalty. 
1 7
By contrast, under a traditional business judgment rule analysis, the
party challenging a board's decision would initially bear the burden
of proving the directors' breach of their duty of loyalty.18
2. Modificatory Resistance.-In contrast to preclusionary re-
sistance, more limited forms of resistance can be used to induce a
hostile bidder to modify the substantive terms of a tender offer that,
in its current form, is justifiably perceived by the target board as
being inimical to the best interests of the corporation. 189 The ulti-
mate goal of such resistance is to reshape the form and substance of
the hostile tender offer in order to obtain optimal benefits for the
shareholders, while at the same time avoiding the undesirable result
of eliminating the possibility of any further takeover bids being
made. In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,190 the Delaware Su-
preme Court found that this type of "modificatory resistance" was
an appropriate defensive response to a potentially harmful hostile
takeover, even though the court did not expressly use these terms.
183. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 253-54 (7th Cir. 1986); Mo-
ran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1354 (Del. 1985). One court has held that a
defensive measure is an unreasonable response when it precludes, as a practical matter, the
acceptance of an admittedly adequately priced and non-coercive hostile tender offer. AC Ac-
quisitions v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 113 (Del. Ch. 1986).
184. See supra text accompanying notes 65-68.
185. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
186. See supra text accompanying notes 109-11.
187. AC Acquisitions v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 114 (Del. Ch. 1986).
188. See supra text accompanying notes 75-80.
189. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 255 (7th Cir. 1986) (discuss-
ing Indiana law, which follows Delaware corporate law).
190. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
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In Unocal, the target directors were confronted with an unsolic-
ited two-tier tender offer that they justifiably regarded as both inad-
equately priced and coercive in its nature.191 After deciding that af-
firmative resistance was warranted, the board authorized a partial
self-tender offer under which fairly priced senior debt securities of
the target corporation would be issued in exchange for its publicly
held shares.192 This defensive maneuver was held to be justifiable
because it was specifically designed to ameliorate the particular
problems posed by the hostile two-tier tender offer. 93 The target's
self-tender offer provided an alternative and non-coercive method for
the shareholders to dispose of their stock at an attractive price. 9 ,
Moreover, this type of defensive tactic also was justifiable as a salu-
tary attempt by the board to induce the hostile bidder to modify its
tender offer.
Presumably, if a hostile suitor wishes to continue to compete
with a more attractively priced and structured self-tender offer made
by the target board, then the original hostile bid will have to be re-
vised to provide more generous terms and conditions.' 9 Such a revi-
sion will, of course, benefit the target company's shareholders by in-
creasing the likelihood that they will ultimately receive fair value for
their shares if a decision to sell is made. In addition, if the hostile
suitor is encouraged to engage in further bidding, there is a greater
likelihood that the struggle for control will ultimately be determined
by the forces of the free market. Such a result is applauded by the
courts as being in accord with the fundamental tenets of our free
enterprise economy.1 96
There are other forms of modifcatory resistance that have
gained judicial acceptance. A defensive measure can be designed to
strengthen the bargaining power of a target board in its negotiations
with an unsolicited bidder to obtain a revised tender offer that will
191. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 (Del. 1985). For a discus-
sion of the nature and effect of two-tier tender offers, see supra note 25.
192. By incurring additional indebtedness on a large scale, the target corporation would,
of course, render itself a less attractive acquisition candidate.
193. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 957 (Del. 1985).
194. This same line of reasoning was followed by the Supreme Court of Delaware in
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 181 (Del. 1986).
195. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that an inadequately priced hostile
tender offer does not provide justification for the target board to adopt a defensive poison pill
plan that precludes the tender offeror not only from consummating his initial bid but also from
making any further bids including a fairly priced one. See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS
Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 259 (7th Cir. 1986) (applying Indiana law, which follows Delaware
corporate law).
196. See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1986);
Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisitions, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 274 (2d Cir. 1986).
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contain more favorable and attractive terms. In Moran v. Household
International, Inc., '19 7 this particular type of modificatory resistance
was validated by the Supreme Court of Delaware as a reasonable
response to perceived threats that might be posed by prospective
takeover attempts.
In Moran, the target directors had reasonable grounds for con-
cluding that their corporation was vulnerable to acquisition by a cor-
porate raider utilizing a coercive, two-tier tender offer that would be
financed by the subsequent dismemberment and sale of the corpora-
tion.19 8 As a result of this fear, the Moran board adopted a "poison
pill" plan that granted the target shareholders redeemable rights to
purchase, at favorable prices, stock in any acquiring corporation into
which the target corporation might ultimately be merged following a
successful takeover.199 The effect of such a purchase plan, if trig-
gered, would be to increase the cost of a hostile acquisition by disas-
trously diluting the hostile acquirer's capital structure. This result
could be avoided, however, if the suitor negotiated an initial agree-
ment with the target board to exercise its power to redeem the poi-
sonous purchase rights. The plan in Moran, therefore, placed the
target board in a superior bargaining position to obtain a more fa-
vorably structured and priced tender offer from the hostile suitor as
a condition for the redemption of the purchase rights. More particu-
larly, if confronted with a coercive two-tier tender offer, the Moran
board could predicate the exercise of its redemption powers upon a
recasting of the hostile tender offer into a form that was not
coercive.200
In upholding the poison pill plan, the court in Moran empha-
sized that the takeover barrier erected by the plan could not be kept
in place if it is found to permanently deter any and all takeover of-
fers. 01 The court noted that when a suitor actually presents a tender
offer and requests the target board to redeem the purchase rights,
the board will be under a fiduciary duty to base its redemption deci-
sion upon a determination of whether or not the interests of the
shareholders will best be served by allowing the tender offer to pro-
ceed free of board resistance. In short, the decision whether to retain
197. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
198. Moran v. Household Int'l. Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del. 1985). For a discussion
of the nature and effect of two-tier tender offers, see supra note 25.
199. For a more general discussion of the operation and effect of poison pill plans, see
supra note 170.
200. Presumably, a non-coercive two-tier tender offer would be one providing equal
value for the target shareholders at both ends of the offer. See supra note 25.
201. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1354 (Del. 1985).
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the poison pill plan as a defense to a particular takeover bid will be
judged by the same criteria that were originally used by the court to
evaluate the board's initial decision to adopt the plan.
Thus, a poison pill defense provides a target board with bargain-
ing flexibility in dealing with various types of attempted takeovers.
In sanctioning such a defense, a court is recognizing the reasonable-
ness of a defensive tactic that can effectively block an objectionable
tender offer but that, at the same time, contains a mechanism for the
dismantlement of the defense if the offer is revised to eliminate its
unpalatable features.202 Therefore, the ultimate validity of a poison
pill plan will be determined by the manner in which the directors
exercise their enhanced bargaining power in response to a bid by an
actual takeover suitor.203
In determining the propriety of any particular form of resis-
tance employed by a board, factors other than the modificatory ef-
fect of the defense will also be considered. There will be stricter judi-
cial scrutiny of defensive tactics that effect major changes in the
governance or value structure of the corporation. The Supreme
Court of Delaware has indicated that it will view defensive tactics
with a degree of skepticism if they: impair the assets of the corpora-
tion; involve major corporate expenditures; require the incurrence of
extensive indebtedness; dilute earnings per share; have adverse tax
consequences for the corporation or the shareholders; adversely af-
fect the market price of the stock; or otherwise impair the continued
financial viability and flexibility of the corporation." 4
The Supreme Court of Delaware, in evaluating any defensive
device, will compare its relative impact upon the value or governance
structure of the corporation with the impact that other judicially ap-
202. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986). In Revlon, the court stated: "In adopting the [poison pill] plan, the board protected the
shareholders from a hostile takeover at a price below the company's intrinsic value, while
retaining sufficient flexibility to address any proposal deemed to be in the stockholder's best
interests." Id. at 181.
203. Poison pill plans have been invalidated when they have been adopted not to en-
hance the good faith bargaining power of the target board but, rather, to create an insuperable
barrier to an attempted takeover. See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250
(7th Cir. 1986). On the other hand, a board may be found to be acting in good faith when it
refuses to redeem the purchase rights under a poison pill plan at the instance of a particular
suitor who refuses to modify its successive bids so as to remove their objectionable features. In
this situation, the board may presumably keep its poison pill defense in place as a permissible
form of selective preclusionary resistance. See infra text accompanying notes 206-08, see also
BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1988).
204. Moran v. Household Int'l., Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1354 (Del. 1985). A classic exam-
ple of a defensive measure that effects a major change in the governance structure of a corpo-
ration is provided in Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984).
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proved defensive mechanisms had upon their respective corporations.
Unfortunately, fully elaborated judicial standards have yet to be ar-
ticulated in this area. It does appear, however, that the more a de-
fensive strategy effects basic structural changes in a corporation, the
greater is the burden upon the directors to justify the reasonableness
of their action under all the relevant circumstances.
The courts have also indicated a willingness to consider, retro-
spectively, whether the defensive measure, as actually employed in
the takeover struggle, furthered the interests of the shareholders. A
defensive measure that stimulates bidding between competing corpo-
rate suitors is favorably regarded by the courts and will likely be
found to meet the test of reasonableness. 5 Courts will consider this
self-validating factor along with other previously discussed factors in
reaching final conclusions as to the appropriateness of a challenged
defensive tactic.
3. Selective Preclusionary Resistance.-Director opposition to
a takeover is not always prompted by an objection to the substantive
terms of the unsolicited tender offer. Sometimes, board resistance is
provoked by a fear that the particular hostile bidder has future plans
for the corporation that would be detrimental to the best interests of
the corporation and its shareholders. To successfully guard against
such an occurrence, the target board must resort to "selective preclu-
sionary resistance." Such resistance will not only defeat the current
tender offer, but will also prevent any further bids by the same hos-
tile suitor. Under certain circumstances, the Delaware courts recog-
nize that this form of resistance may be a reasonable defensive
response.
In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,2 °0 the
Supreme Court of Delaware acknowledged, at least implicitly, that
target directors confronted by an attempted takeover may sometimes
properly employ defensive tactics designed to preserve the existing
corporate entity. The reasonably perceived threat confronting the
target board in Revlon was the hostile suitor's plan to finance its
acquisition by subsequently selling off pieces of Revlon's business,
presumably at a substantial profit.2 7 Among the several defensive
205. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
In Revlon, the court upheld the initial validity of a poison pill plan allowing the target share-
holders to exchange their stock for newly issued premium value debt securities of the target
corporation. Id. at 181.
206. 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
207. Id. at 181. In addition to portending a break-up of the target corporation, the
tender offer in Revlon was also inadequately priced. In analyzing the reasonableness of the
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strategies authorized by the Revlon board was a partial self-tender
offer. Under this strategy, newly issued and attractively priced Rev-
lon securities would be exchanged for Revlon's publicly held stock.
The securities contained waivable restrictive covenants that severely
limited the target's ability to incur additional debt, sell its assets or
pay dividends. These covenants, therefore, would act as a major de-
terrent to any takeover and merger in which the hostile acquirer ulti-
mately planned to sell the assets of the merged target corporation in
order to finance its acquisition. Presumably, the target board would
refuse any requests to waive these covenants if any further bids were
made by the same hostile suitor bent upon a break-up and sale of the
corporation.
The court in Revlon held that the partial self-tender offer and
restrictive covenants were reasonable defensive responses given the
nature of the harm posed by the takeover. 08 Thus, when target di-
rectors are faced with the prospect that a takeover will result in the
dismemberment and sale of their corporation, the directors may be
justified in resorting to selective preclusionary resistance. Although
the court in Revlon did not specifically discuss this point, it appears
that the maintenance of such resistance by a continuing refusal to
waive the covenants is only warranted while the target corporation
continues to enjoy favorable business prospects. Particularly, if there
is a reasonable expectation for corporate growth and development,
the financial interests of the target shareholders are likely to be best
served by allowing the target corporation to continue as an inte-
grated economic enterprise. 09
Perhaps the best known form of selective preclusionary resis-
tance is the payment of "greenmail" by a target corporation to an
unwanted suitor. The term "greenmail" refers to the practice of a
target corporation buying back its stock from a takeover bidder, at a
premium that is not made available to other target shareholders, in
various defense strategies adopted by the board, the court did not clearly indicate whether it
was speaking of a given strategy as being an appropriate response to the break-up threat or to
the inadequate price threat. As a result, the court's opinion lends itself to varying interpreta-
tions including the one advanced in the text.
208. Id. The court also found that the Revlon board acted properly in initially adopting
a poison pill plan for the purpose of selective preclusionary resistance. Id. at 180. For an
example of another case in which a court has upheld comparable restrictive covenants, see
GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
209. Presumably, if the hostile suitor bent on a break-up continued to increase the
amount of its tender offer, a point would eventually be reached where the financial interests of
the shareholders would best be served by ending the selective preclusionary resistance through
a board waiver of the restrictive covenants.
HOSTILE TAKEOVERS
order to prevent a takeover.2 10 This type of resistance was recently
upheld by the Supreme Court of Delaware in Polk v. Good."1' Due
to the unusual fact situation in Polk, however, the case may be of
limited precedential value regarding the general validity of green-
mail as a defensive response.
In Polk, the target oil company had just completed one of the
largest business acquisitions in history by purchasing another oil
company at a cost of over $10 billion. Thereafter, a major share-
holder of the target corporation indicated that it might make an un-
solicited tender offer to the target shareholders. Fearing that the
trauma of a hostile takeover would disrupt the target corporation's
plans for an orderly assimilation of its own recent business acquisi-
tion, the target board agreed to repurchase its shares held by the
hostile suitor at a three percent premium over the stock's then mar-
ket value. In exchange, the hostile suitor agreed not to purchase any
additional stock of the target for a period of ten years. Given the
unique economic situation confronting the target corporation, the
court found that the payment of greenmail was an appropriate de-
fensive tactic.212 Selective preclusionary resistance, such as green-
mail, may, therefore, be viewed as warranted in response to a chal-
lenge for corporate control that could have a seriously disruptive
effect on the orderly implementation of previously made business
plans deemed vital to the corporation's future stability and welfare.
At this point, attention should be drawn to an earlier Delaware
decision in which the payment of greenmail was also permitted. In
Cheff v. Mathes,2 ' the court found that the target board had rea-
sonable grounds for its apprehension that a hostile suitor was seeking
to obtain control in order to make a material change in the corpora-
tion's established sales policies. The board considered these sales pol-
icies essential to the company's future commercial success. Respond-
ing to this perceived threat to the maintenance of the corporate
status quo, the board authorized the repurchase of the target shares
held by the hostile suitor at a premium price. The court held this
payment of greenmail to be an appropriate defense strategy because
210. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 n.13 (Del. 1985). A num-
ber of commentators have condemned greenmail. It is said that this defensive tactic is fre-
quently used to perpetuate incumbent management in office and inequitably confers upon the
shareholders seeking control benefits which are not made available to the other shareholders.
For an evaluation of these arguments as well as a detailed analysis of greenmail, see Macey &
McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail, 95 YALE L.J. 13 (1985).
211. 507 A.2d 531 (Del. 1986).
212. Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 537 (Del. 1986).
213. 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964).
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the board "believed, with justification, that there was a reasonable
threat to the continued existence of [the target corporation] or at
least existence in its present form."214
The reasoning of the Cheff court is specious at best. To hold
that greenmail is permissible whenever a takeover endangers the
continued observance of highly regarded business operating policies
is to establish a very lubricous basis for making a reasoned determi-
nation that selective preclusionary resistance is justifiable under the
circumstances. The essence of the court's view is that such resistance
is permissible whenever a takeover may seriously interfere with the
conventional conduct of ordinary corporate business. This rationale
for mounting defenses appears to be available to most boards facing
an attempted takeover. Inventive corporate apologists for challenged
board resistance will usually be able to construct, at least retrospec-
tively, a credible argument that the attempted takeover would cause
changes in corporate policy that would prevent business from being
conducted in the usual manner. By definition, any change, including
a change in management, is disruptive of the status quo. However,
such change may be the catalyst needed to revive a torpid target
corporation that is currently managed by a lethargic or inept board.
Thus, the court in Cheff was much too generous in setting such
broad parameters for permissible selective preclusionary resistance.
Carried to its logical extreme, the broad reasoning in Cheff would
apparently provide potential grounds for indiscriminate opposition to
takeovers in all instances. Such a result, however, was clearly re-
jected by the Delaware courts in subsequent decisions.2 15
There is considerable doubt regarding the compatibility of Dela-
ware's new approach to takeovers with the narrow factual holding of
Cheff. Undoubtedly, Cheff provided the seminal concepts that led to
Delaware's revision, in Unocal, of the traditional business judgment
rule as applied to takeovers.' The rearticulated rule in Unocal,
however, appears to mandate a more searching and rigorous stan-
dard of review than was employed in Cheff21 In addition, contem-
porary courts are now more knowledgeable and sophisticated when
analyzing the legal issues raised by takeover struggles, and are more
sensitive to the nuances and implications of particular defensive tac-
tics. Therefore, the Cheff case cannot currently be regarded as enun-
214. Id. at __ 199 A.2d at 556.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 65-68.
216. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
217. See supra text accompanying notes 157-62.
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ciating broad principles of general applicability.
Selective preclusionary resistance is one of the strongest types of
defensive responses permitted by the courts. When this tactic is uti-
lized, it effectively prevents the target shareholders from receiving
and considering bids from a specific potential suitor. The opportuni-
ties for target shareholders to profit from their investments by ac-
cepting premium tender offers are thereby diminished. In addition,
such resistance diminishes the market accountability of current man-
agement by precluding a specific potential suitor from effecting a
change in corporate control. Given the ramifications of selective
preclusionary resistance, only compelling business reasons justify its
usage.
XIV. The Judicial Deference Accorded Independent Directors
There is yet another important feature of Delaware's revised
business judgment rule that must be considered. Greater judicial
deference will be granted to an anti-takeover decision made by a
target board having a majority of non-management or outside mem-
bers. When board authorization of a defensive measure is chal-
lenged, the directors do not enjoy any legal inference of propriety
until they initially prove that they had legitimate grounds for oppos-
ing the hostile suitor and that they selected a defensive tactic that
was reasonable in relation to the peril posed by the takeover. In at-
tempting to meet these burdens of proof, however, the quality of the
evidence presented by the board is "materially enhanced" when
more than one-half of the board's membership consists of outside or
independent directors. 18 Presumably, outside directors will be less
concerned than inside directors with their continued tenure on the
board. Furthermore, it is believed that outside directors will be capa-
ble of making a more objective, dispassionate decision as to whether
a takeover, which necessarily involves the ouster of incumbent man-
agement, should be resisted.
The deference accorded outside directors may be of considera-
ble procedural importance when a court is called upon to determine
whether a challenged target board has discharged its initial burdens
of proof, thereby entitling its members to a presumption of propriety
under the business judgment rule. For example, when an anti-take-
over measure has been adopted by a board having a majority of non-
management directors and it appears that the defensive action was
218. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985).
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based upon the expert advice of investment bankers and legal coun-
sel, there is a prima facie showing that the directors' decision was
made in good faith and after a reasonable investigation. The Su-
preme Court of Delaware has stated that in this situation when
outside directors are in a majority, those challenging the board will
bear "a heavy burden .. . [in] overcoming the presumptions thus
attaching to the board's decisions. "219 Whether such presumptions
are warranted, however, is debatable.
One jurist noted that it is "appallingly naive" to regard outside
directors as necessarily disinterested parties whose views are auto-
matically entitled to special judicial homage.22 The relationship be-
tween outside directors and inside management directors often
evolves into one of passive dependency. Several factors contribute to
this phenomena. Since incumbent management normally will have
de facto control of the proxies to be voted in director elections, it can
be argued that outside directors initially are selected by management
and then continue to serve at the pleasure of these insiders. The
outside directors, therefore, may be inclined to follow the decision-
making preferences of the management who hired them.2 l
The development of a symbiotic relationship between the
outside directors and inside directors is also encouraged by another
factor. It is a well-known fact of corporate life that the outside direc-
tors will normally only spend a portion of their time dealing with the
affairs of the corporation. Outside directors, therefore, can be ex-
pected to seek and follow, in varying degrees, the advice and counsel
of the inside directors who are more knowledgeable about the corpo-
rate enterprise.222 Consequently, outside directors will sometimes fail
to exercise independent judgment and will instead "rubber stamp"
the anti-takeover proposals of management.223 Given the realities of
the corporate structure in which outside directors function, it may
well be "appallingly naive" for a court to mechanically presume the
integrity of a decision rendered by a board that is dominated only
numerically by non-management directors. A more realistic ap-
219. Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 537 (Del. 1986). For a discussion of the role played by
special committees of outside directors in takeovers, see Simpson, The Emerging Role of the
Special Committee - Ensuring Business Judgment Rule Protection in the Context of Man-
agement Leveraged Buyouts and Other Corporate Transactions Involving Conflicts of Inter-
est, 43 Bus. LAw. 665 (1988).
220. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 300 (7th Cir.) (Cudahy, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
221. Id. See M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 146-47 (1976).
222. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1986).
223. See, e.g., Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 886 (6th Cir. 1986).
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proach is to condition any conferral of judicial deference upon, at
least, a minimal showing that the outside directors autonomously ex-
ercised their judgment on a self-informed and genuinely deliberative
basis.224
XV. The Delaware Auction Rule
Consideration now must be given to the last major element of
Delaware's revised approach toward evaluating directorial action op-
posing takeovers. Under certain circumstances, the courts will em-
ploy a standard of review that differs from the one previously dis-
cussed in assessing the response of a target board to an unsolicited
tender offer. When it appears that a struggle among competing bid-
ders for corporate control will inevitably result in the break-up and
sale of the target corporation, regardless of which suitor prevails, the
further use of defensive measures is proscribed. The role of the tar-
get board then becomes that of an auctioneer, whose sole task is to
facilitate further bidding from all sources as a means of maximizing
the opportunities for the shareholders to profit from their corporate
investments. The previously discussed Revlon decision clearly and
forcefully expresses this view that the target board must become a
mandatory public vendor on certain occasions.a 5 A comprehensive
examination of the facts in Revlon is required for a thorough under-
standing of the operation of this "auction" rule.
In Revlon, Pantry Pride, Inc. made an unsolicited cash tender
offer for all of the publicly held shares of Revlon, Inc. At that time,
the Revlon board had reasonable grounds for concluding that the
offer was both underpriced and likely to be financed by the eventual
dismantlement and sale of the corporation's constituent divisions.
The Revlon board, therefore, adopted several different defensive
strategies designed to repel the takeover and to preserve the corpora-
tion as an integrated economic entity. First, a poison pill defense was
mounted, which gave Revlon shareholders redeemable option rights
to exchange their stock for newly-issued, premium value debt securi-
224. When a corporation is initially confronted with an unsolicited tender offer, a mea-
sure of institutionalized autonomy may be achieved for the outside directors by having them
first meet and deliberate separately in order to formulate a proposal for the target corpora-
tion's response to the takeover. This proposal may then be submitted to the entire board. If the
proposal is then adopted, the resulting board action could be regarded as presenting a prima
facie case for receiving special judicial deference. Procedures of this sort have been utilized on
several occasions by target corporations. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946, 950 (Del. 1985); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984).
225. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
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ties of the corporation.2 6 The Revlon board then erected another
barrier to a takeover by Pantry Pride by authorizing a partial self-
tender offer, under which Revlon shares could be exchanged for an
attractively priced package of preferred stock and corporate notes
with restrictive covenants.22 7 The partial self-tender offer was
quickly subscribed and the new preferred stock and notes were is-
sued, subject to waivable restrictive covenants that severely limited
Revlon's ability to incur additional debt, sell its assets, or pay divi-
dends. Aside from enhancing the market value of the notes, the re-
strictive covenants also provided Revlon with some protection against
a buyout and merger by an unfriendly suitor. Since the covenants
restricted Revlon's ability to sell its assets, it was hoped that they
would discourage a bidder, such as Pantry Pride, who ultimately
looked to a sale of Revlon's assets as the source of its financing for
the buyout. Despite these defensive tactics, Pantry Pride continued
to increase its bid price, conditioned upon either the judicial invali-
dation or the Revlon board's abandonment of the defensive
measures.
The Revlon board then attempted to negotiate an amicable ac-
quisition of the corporation, at a higher price, by a "white knight"
- Forstmann Little & Co. The parties agreed that Forstmann
would make a tender offer for Revlon's stock, at a price exceeding
the last bid made by Pantry Pride, as part of a leveraged buyout of
Revlon by Forstmann in which Revlon management would partici-
pate.228 As a firm specializing in leveraged buyouts, Forstmann was
expected to finance its acquisition by eventually selling off some of
Revlon's component parts. In furtherance of this expectation, the
Revlon board agreed to sell some of its divisions to outsiders in order
to provide Forstmann with acquisition funds, which would then be
available upon the consummation of the leveraged buyout and
merger with Revlon. To further assist its friendly suitor, the Revlon
board redeemed the poison pill plan and waived the restrictive cove-
nants on its recently issued notes.
Undaunted, Pantry Pride continued to increase the amount of
its tender offer. Forstmann then agreed to remain in the bidding con-
test, but only for a price. As a condition of making a new bid that
would slightly exceed Pantry Pride's last bid, Forstmann insisted
226. For a general discussion of the nature and operation of poison pill plans, see supra
note 170.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 206-09.
228. For a general discussion of the nature and operation of leveraged buyouts, see
supra note 121.
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upon, and was granted by the Revlon board, a lock-up option to
purchase one of Revlon's most valuable divisions for a price consid-
erably below the lowest valuation placed upon that division by Rev-
lon's own investment bankers." 9 This option would become exercisa-
ble if any third party, such as Pantry Pride, acquired forty percent
of Revlon's shares. As additional consideration for this lock-up op-
tion, Forstmann agreed to exchange new securities for the previously
issued and less financially attractive Revlon notes, which had begun
to decline in price following the waiver of the restrictive covenants
safeguarding their value. The Revlon directors had become con-
cerned that these faltering notes might lead to lawsuits against the
board by the increasingly restive and irate note holders. The final
feature of the agreement was a "no-shop" clause that forbade Rev-
lon from amicably entertaining any further competing bids from
third parties.
The Supreme Court of Delaware held that Pantry Pride was
entitled to a preliminary injunction enjoining both the consummation
of the Forstmann lock-up option and the implementation of the no-
shop agreement. In reaching its decision, the court discussed in de-
tail all of the successive defensive strategies employed by Revlon.
The poison pill plan and the restrictive covenants, although subse-
quently abandoned by Revlon, were deemed appropriate defensive
responses at the time of their initial adoption.230 Those measures
were found to be consistent with the Revlon board's original lawful
policy of attempting to protect the corporate entity against the rea-
sonably perceived threat of a break-up and sale by a hostile suitor.
As the struggle for control progressed, however, the Revlon board
effectively repudiated its original policy by entering an agreement
with Forstmann that would inevitably lead to the dismemberment of
the company.
The fiduciary responsibilities of the Revlon board were drasti-
cally altered once it negotiated the leveraged buyout agreement with
Forstmann, which would ultimately be financed by a break-up and
sale of the corporation. Thus, by recognizing that the constituent
parts of the business were ultimately for sale, the Revlon board
could no longer say that Pantry Pride represented a threat to contin-
ued corporate policy and effectiveness. Since the corporation would
229. For a general discussion of the nature and operation of lock-up options, see supra
note 122.
230. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180-81 (Del.
1986).
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be taken apart in any event, the court stated that "[t]he whole ques-
tion of defensive measures became moot. The directors' role changed
from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with
getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the com-
pany."2 ' Therefore, when both the hostile suitor and friendly suitor
contemplate the dismnemberment and sale of the target, the target
board can only serve the best interests of its shareholders by foster-
ing a competitive bidding process. Only when the target board en-
courages full participation by all bidders in the auction will the
shareholders be able to maximize the return on their investment.
Given its change in basic policy, the Revlon board could only
justify granting a lock-up option to Forstmann by demonstrating
that it promoted competitive bidding between Forstmann and Pantry
Pride. This the Revlon board could not do. The lock-up option price
had been set by the Revlon board at such a low level that Pantry
Pride, for all practical purposes, would be forced to withdraw from
the bidding contest out of fear that Forstmann might exercise its
option.2 32 From Pan try Pride's point of view, exercise of the Forst-
mann option would financially cripple Revlon by stripping it of some
of its most valuable assets for a totally inadequate consideration.
Thus, the court viewed the lock-up option, as well as the no-shop
agreement, as part of an impermissible strategy decision by the Rev-
lon board to put an end to further competitive bidding. Accordingly,
these measures were enjoined."'3
The Revlon decision enunciates a principle of broad equitable
application. When several bidders are making relatively similar rea-
sonable offers, or when dissolution of the target company has become
inevitable, the target directors must treat the contending factions
evenhandedly.2"" To be sure, favoritism toward a white knight, even
to the total exclusion of a hostile bidder, may be justified if the hos-
231. Id. at 182. One court has indicated that when a target board adopts a recapitaliza-
tion plan that will effectively shift control of the corporation from its public shareholders to
management, the board has recognized the inevitability of the sale of the corporation. Accord-
ingly, the board subjects itself to the strictures of the Delaware auction rule. Black & Decker
Corp. v. American Standard, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 772 (D. Del. 1988).
232. Id. at 183.
233. The court also indicated that the Revlon board had acted improperly in granting
the lock-up option as part of a deal to obtain Forstmann's assistance in shoring up the faltering
market value of the notes issued in connection with the partial self-tender offer. As this was
done by the board presumably in part to avoid litigation on the part of the irate noteholders,
the board could be viewed as acting out of self-interest and in breach of its fiduciary duty of
loyalty to the shareholders. The court stated that "such concern for non-stockholder interests is
inappropriate when an auction among active bidders is in progress, and the object no longer is
to protect or maintain the corporate enterprise but to sell it to the highest bidder." Id. at 182.
234. Id. at 184.
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tile bidder's offer is not in the best interest of the target sharehold-
ers.23 5 Discriminatory treatment, however, is not justified in the con-
text of an on-going auction of the corporation's component parts.
Instead, market forces should be allowed to operate freely in order to
allow the target shareholders to sell to the highest bidder .2 3  The
Delaware auction rule, therefore, reaffirms the quintessential right of
shareholders to make those fundamental decisions of corporate own-
ership and control that affect the ultimate destiny of the corpora-
tion.2 37 Only by recognizing this bedrock principle can the basic
modes of corporate governance be maintained.
XVI. Conclusion
When a corporation finds itself caught in the maelstrom of an
attempted takeover, the beleaguered shareholders frequently need a
common representative to protect their financial interests.23 8 Because
of their inability to act collectively in responding to a tender offer,
the shareholders require a knowledgeable bargaining agent that will
attempt to maximize the value of their corporate investment as the
successive stages of the struggle for control unfold. As the elected
representative of the shareholders, the board of directors is the ap-
propriate body to fulfill this function.
Directors have an affirmative duty to evaluate tender offers and
oppose those that are determined to be detrimental to the best inter-
ests of the shareholders.3 ' A troublesome question arises, however,
when the particular defensive tactics employed by a target board are
challenged in court: Is the traditional business judgment rule an ap-
propriate standard of review for directorial decisions made while the
corporation is under virtual siege by a hostile suitor? The courts
have provided different answers to this question. 4"
When applying the traditional business judgment rule to anti-
takeover measures, a court's inquiry has a narrow focus: the board of
235. Presumably, if both contending factions were making either inadequately priced or
coercively structured bids, the employment of defensive tactics against both factions could be
justified.
236. In the context of an auction, at least one court has devised injunctive relief requir-
ing the target directors to take affirmative steps in order to ensure an open and impartial
bidding process. See Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986). The view has
also been advanced that even in the context of an admitted auction, a target board may favor
one buyer over another if the interests of the target shareholders will thereby be served. See In
re J.P. Stevens & Co., 542 A.2d 770 (Del. Ch. 1988).
237. See supra text accompanying notes 118-19.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 32-37.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 38-42.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 104-12 and 157-62.
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directors.2 41 Two principal questions are asked. First, did the direc-
tors in their deliberations meet the standards imposed by the fiduci-
ary duty of care? Second, were the directors sufficiently disinterested
to meet the standards imposed by the fiduciary duty of loyalty? This
limited review may be suitable for routine commercial decisions
made by a board.242 Anti-takeover decisions, however, are unique
and are prompted by a rare event in the life of a corporation - an
attempted takeover. 43 The response of the directors may have a
profound impact upon the ultimate destiny of the corporation. Ac-
cordingly, a more searching and extensive form of judicial review is
required than that afforded by the traditional business judgment
rule.2 ,4  A heightened standard of review is also necessitated by the
inherent risk that the integrity of the board's decision-making pro-
cess may have been compromised by motives of self-entrenchment. 24 5
In assessing a target board's anti-takeover decisions, a form of
review is required that will focus not only upon the directors, but
also upon the reasonableness of the specific directorial action taken
in relation to the perceived threat of harm posed by the takeover.
The new Delaware approach to takeovers provides a viable frame-
work for undertaking such an extended form of review.246
Unlike the traditional business judgment rule, which initially
places the burden of proof upon those challenging a directorial deci-
sion, the new Delaware approach places the initial burden of proof
upon the directors seeking to justify their opposition to the attempted
241. See supra text accompanying notes 104-11.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 145-47.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 148-50.
244. For an example and discussion of the analytic difficulties which the courts have
encountered in seeking a more rigorous form of judicial review within the confines of the tradi-
tional business judgment rule, see supra text accompanying notes 128-44.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 151-56.
246. In 1988, Delaware enacted legislation regulating takeovers. Under the new law,
hostile acquirers are prohibited from merging with the target corporation or from obtaining
the benefit of the target's assets or cash flow for a period of three years following the tender
offer. These restrictions do not apply to bidders who obtain prior approval for the acquisition
from the target board of directors nor to bidders who commence their tender offers with less
than fifteen percent of the target shares and then obtain at least eighty-five percent of the
shares not controlled by certain target insiders. Many securities attorneys are of the opinion
that this new legislation will not have any significant impact upon the manner in which strug-
gles for corporate control are conducted. The new law will undoubtedly encourage suitors to
negotiate with the target board in an effort to obtain the board's prior approval of the acquisi-
tion. In addition, tender offerors may raise their initial bid prices in order to increase the
likelihood of their obtaining at least eighty-five percent of the shares. The law should also
discourage two-tier tender offers involving a contemplated merger with the target corporation
as a means of financing the tender offer. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1988); Sontag, Court
Challenges to Delaware Takeover Law Begin, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 15, 1988, at 37, col. 1. For a
discussion of the operation of two-tier tender offers, see supra note 25.
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takeover. The target board bears a two-fold burden. First, the direc-
tors are required to demonstrate that they had both an informed and
reasonable basis for concluding that the pending takeover placed the
corporate enterprise in jeopardy.241 Second, the directors must
demonstrate that their defensive response was reasonable in relation
to the threat posed by the takeover.2 48 Resistance that is primarily
designed to perpetuate the directors in office is not deemed a reason-
able response.
If the directors successfully discharge their two-fold burden of
proof, they may invoke the presumption of propriety traditionally af-
forded by the business judgment rule.2 49 The burden of persuasion
then shifts to those challenging the target board. In order to prevail,
the challenger must establish that the target directors were in breach
of either their duty of loyalty or their duty of care. In its totality, the
new Delaware standard of review is both exacting and far-reaching.
It provides a suitable analytic structure for focusing not only upon
the directors themselves, but also upon the substantive reasonable-
ness of their action, as well as the sufficiency of the cause precipitat-
ing that action.
The development of an appropriate standard of review in hostile
takeover cases is ultimately dependent upon the manner in which it
is judicially applied and elaborated. The Delaware courts have only
commenced this task. Although a comprehensive rule structure has
not yet been formulated for determining the permissible bounds of
director resistance under all circumstances, certain general and laud-
able principles have emerged. Defensive measures will be deemed fa-
tally defective if they totally foreclose the possibility of any takeover
bids ever being received by the target shareholders. 50 Instead, de-
fensive stratagems should be designed to induce the hostile suitor to
make a more favorably structured and priced tender offer in order to
provide the shareholders with the greatest possible return on their
investments.25 1 Certain defensive tactics that strengthen the bargain-
ing power of the board in its negotiations with an unsolicited bidder
are also permissible, because they may ultimately provide the share-
holders with an increased return on their investments.252 On the
other hand, defensive devices, such as greenmail, which are designed
247. See supra text accompanying notes 163-82.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 183-217.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 161-62.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 183-88.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 189-96.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 197-203.
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to permanently deter a particular hostile suitor from making any
further bids, are of questionable merit.2 53 Only compelling business
reasons will justify the use of such resistance.
The problem still remains, however, that almost any anti-take-
over measure has the capacity to serve as a vehicle for the perpetua-
tion of the incumbent board in office. As such, board opposition to a
takeover always remains suspect. The new Delaware approach, by
shifting the burden of proof, partially addresses this problem. A
more direct approach, however, is required. Courts should, therefore,
explicitly incorporate into their standard of review the ultimate justi-
fication for the adoption of defensive measures - shareholder wealth
maximization. The new Delaware standard should expressly recog-
nize this basic fact of corporate life. Such a result could be accom-
plished by a further refinement of the initial burden of proof that is
placed upon the target directors. In establishing that their defensive
response was a reasonable one, the directors should also be required
to show that their resistance was demonstrably related to share-
holder wealth maximization.
Attempted takeovers place the corporate investment of share-
holders at risk. Therefore, directorial action should be required to
meet standards expressly cast in terms of the promotion of share-
holder welfare.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 206-17.
